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I. INTRODUCTION
The United States semiconductor industry,which produces
high-technology electronic components for computers,has become
increasingly alarmed at the emergence of significant Japanese com-
petition for both the domestic and international markets.' The in-
dustry's concern is reflected in a growing number of press and maga-
zine articles2 which voice resentment over Japanese business tactics3
and anger at the failure of the United States government to protect
domestic interests.
4
The industry's complaints5 emanate primarily from an area
south of San Francisco known as Silicon Valley' where many United
States manufacturers of electronic components are located.' These
firms manufacture extremely complex microscopic assemblies of
1. Bylinski, The Japanese Spies in Silicon Valley, FORTUNE, Feb. 27, 1978, at 74
[hereinafter cited as FORTUNE].
2. Id.; The Computer Society, TME, Feb. 20, 1978, at 53 [hereinafter cited as TIME];
D. Hoefler, MICROELECTRONics NEWS, July 16, 1977.
3. FORTUNE, supra note 1, at 74. Two executives are quoted: "They are out to slit our
throats and we'd better recognize that and do something about it." "There's a war on and
both sides know it."
4. Id. at 78, 79.
5. Id.; see D. Hoefler, MICROFLECTRONics NEWS (1977-1978).
6. Silicon Valley's proper name is Santa Clara County, California.
7. FORTUNE, supra note 1, at 74.
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electronic circuitry imprinted on small crystals - "chips". S The so-
briquet "Silicon Valley" is derived from the main chemical constit-
uent of electronic chips, Silicon?
Each advance in high technology chip design and manufacture
greatly affects the economy of other industries because of the mush-
rooming use of computers in all areas of commercial and intellectual
life. 0 New developments in technology appear with astonishing fre-
quency: today's innovation is tomorrow's cliche."
In the computer business, a company's assets include both in-
dustrial and intellectual property. 12 Industrial property encompas-
ses physical assets such as machinery, buildings and raw materi-
als. 13 Intellectual property includes tangible assets such as books,
records and manufacturing specifications and intangible assets such
as trade secrets" and know-how. 15 Know-how that promotes the
development of sophisticated and specialized semiconductor tech-
nology is extremely valuable property. Chip manufacturers must
protect this know-how in order to remain in the vanguard of one of
the world's most volatile industries.
Competition within the semiconductor industry is fierce. 16 Se-
crecy is essential in order to preserve the fruits of research and
development for the benefit of the companies responsible for them.
The Silicon Valley complaints of unfair Japanese competition pres-
ent a variety of problems in the protection of sensitive material. The
charges range from industrial espionage17 and misappropriation of
know-how' s to covert information gathering 9 and dubious business
8. See J. SoMA, THE COMPUTR INDUSTRY: AN ECONOMIc-LEGAL ANALYSIS OF ITS TECHNOL-
OGY-AND GROwTH, at 96; TIME, supra note 2, at 56.
9. TIME, supra note 2, at 56.
10. Id. at 44; FORTUNE, supra note 1, at 74. (The 1977 sales volume of just one pioneering
firm, Intel, was $282 million).
11. See generally TIME, supra note 2, at 44.
12. WADE, INTRODUCTION (1976), INDUSTRIAL ESPIONAGE AND MISUSE OF TRADE SECRETS
(1964) at 96; TIME, supra note 2, at 56.
13. Id.
14. The most comprehensive definition of a trade secret is provided in the RESTATEMENT
OF TORTS. Here it should suffice to quote: "A trade secret may consist of any formula, pattern,
device or compilation of information which is used in one's business and which gives him an
opportunity to obtain an advantage over competitors who do not know or use it ....
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS, Explanatory Notes § 757, comment b at 5 (1939).
15. Know-how is "the informational and experiential expertise related to practical appli-
cation of specifics . . . ." 12 MILGRIM, BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS, TRADE SECRETS, § 2.09[31,
(1978) [hereinafter cited as 12 MLGEiM].
16. TIME, supra note 2, at 51.
17. FORTUNE, supra note 1, at 74-75.
18. Id. at 75.
19. Id.
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ethics."0 The problem is compounded by allegations that the Japa-
nese government supports the Japanese companies through protec-
tive trade tarifffs," dumping practices22 and direct economic sup-
port of high-technology development. 23 Domestic manufacturers are
increasingly resentful of both Japanese policy, which aids its own
semiconductor industry and of United States policy which does
not.Y
Longevity in semiconductor manufacturing requires the protec-
tion of intangible as well as tangible assets. Trade secrets and know-
how must be safeguarded from possible theft, misappropriation or
inadvertent disclosure.25 In the United States, law in the area of
trade secret protection is fairly well established but novel problems
continue to surface. 21 In Japan, the development of corresponding
legal protection has scarcely begun. 2 United States industries which
consider themselves the victims of unfair Japanese competition are
frustrated therefore by both the ineffectiveness of legal remedies in
a rapidly changing technological context and by the support given
Japanese industries by their government. The absence of interna-
tional remedies further aggravates the problem.
The complaints of Silicon Valley manufacturers raise several
questions of international and domestic law. If Japanese industrial
espionage or trade secret misappropriation is a prevalent activity,
why are there few if any legal actions against the Japanese? Are
domestic remedies inapplicable to Japanese misconduct? Cdn rem-
edies be found in Japan? Are there international resources such as
treaties, agreements, conventions, or tribunals that may be utilized
for coping with the alleged misconduct? If domestic or international
20. Id.
21. Id. at 78.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 75; note particularly the $250 million program to develop Very Large Scale
Integration (VLSI). VLSI refers to the next advance over present chip technology, called
Large Scale Integration (LSI). See also TIME, supra note 2, at 55.
24. FORTUNE, supra note 1, at 79. A semiconductor executive is quoted:' " . . . they have
the unfair advantage of having their government on their side, and it seems that they have
our government on their side as well."
25. F. DESSEMONTET, THE LEGAL PROTECTION OF KNow-How IN THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA 15-16 (rev. 2d ed. 1976); Trade Secrets: Protecting a Very Special "Property," 26
Bus. LAW. 681 (1971); Comment, Industrial Espionage: Piracy of Secret Scientific and Tech-
nical Information, 14 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 911 (1967).
26. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470 (1974); Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite
Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234 (1964), rehearing denied, 377 U.S. 913 (1964); Sears, Roebuck &
Co. v. Stiffel Co. 376 U.S. 225 (1964), rehearing denied, 376 U.S. 973 (1964).
27. Lyon & Doi, The Protection of Unpatented Know-how and Trade Secrets in the
United States and Japan, in PATENT AND KNow-How LEASING IN JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES
30, 31 (T. Doi & L. Shattuck, eds. 1977).
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resources are available but not employed, may it be inferred that
the complaints of wrongful conduct are merely propaganda designed
to muster support for government economic sanctions against legiti-
mate but threatening foreign competition? Or are the desired eco-
nomic sanctions the only effective defense that can be introduced
against otherwise impervious unfair competition?
The facts available are insufficient for clear answers to many
of these questions. If additional facts were available, they might
very well provide such answers and also prove allegations of injuries
for which relief is available. The purpose of this note, accordingly,
is to present a broad spectrum of protections against unfair prac-
tices that would provide relief if the allegations could be proved.
After setting out the protective mechanisms available, the note con-
siders their application to Silicon Valley's complaints. The presen-
tation indicates the lack of satisfactory solutions to legal problems
that accumulate in rapidly developing technological industries.
More particularly, it also exposes a troublesome area of United
States-Japanese relations that is expected to grow both more impor-
tant and more complex."
These problems in the Japanese competitive context open con-
troversial questions of political and administrative policies. Al-
though such questions are tantalizing, answers free of subjective
considerations are virtually impossible to provide and will not be
offered here. Instead we shall suggest that the semiconductor indus-
try seek protective relief based on particular arguments that appear
compatible with current administrative and judicial standards.
Following this section introducing the Silicon Valley com-
plaints, Section II describes the technological environment in which
they arise. Section III deals with the legal protection available in the
United States, in Japan and on the international level. In Section
IV, applications of the protective mechanisms to Silicon Valley's
allegations are analyzed. This analysis suggests that the imposition
of countervailing duties on imports of Japanese chips would be an
appropriate remedy for Japanese trade practices. Section V looks
into the prospects for such countervailing duties. Section VI con-
tains our conclusions.
28. "[Japan] has declared that the information industry is the strategic industry of the
future and has set the goal of increasing computer exports at the dizzying r~te of 30.4 percent
a year through 1985." Uttal, Japan's Big Push in Computers, FORTUNE, Sept. 25, 1978, at 65.
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II. BACKGROUND: The Technological Environment of
the Semiconductor Industry Poses Special Challenges to
the Legal System
In order to appreciate the special character of the legal prob-
lems arising in international competition in the semiconductor
industry, one should first picture the manufacturing environment
in which the legal problems arise. In order to picture this environ-
ment, one should be introduced to the product in controversy-
the chip-and the technology involved in its production.
A. Chip Manufacturing: A High-Technology Industry That Portends
Special Legal Problems.
The computer component industry is similar to other high-
technology industries in which Japan competes aggressively, such
as speciality steels and automobiles,in that it requires large invest-
ment in plant and production equipment. The industry is different,
however, in at least two respects. First, there are many more indi-
vidual semiconductor manufacturers29 than in the early days of au-
tomobile, steel or aircraft manufacture. Second, the period during
which innovations in computer technology provide a market advan-
tage is much shorter than corresponding periods in other indus-
tries.3 These characteristics induce a business atmosphere in which
risks and potential rewards are high, competition is intense and
companies either grow or perish.31
The phenomenal growth and dynamic change in the electronic
components and computer industries are reflected in a variety of
ways. The speed of computer operations (storage and retrieval of
information, computation, etc.) has increased more than one
hundred million times since 1945.32 The cost per unit of memory has
decreased by a factor of at least a thousand in the last decade.3
"Computer power" has increased tenfold every eight years since
1946. 31 Whatever the measure used by technicians, both layperson
and technician can recognize how rapidly computer technology ad-
vances from year to year by noting the increased use of computers
29. Noyce, Microelectronics, in MICROELECTRONICS 3, at 8-9 (1977); TIME, supra note 2,
at 50.
30. Hodges, Microelectronic Memories, in MICROELECTRONICS 53, 63; Noyce, supra note
29, at 8.
31. Hodges, supra note 30; Noyce, supra note 29, at 8; TIME, supra note 2, at 51.
32. J. SoMA, supra note 8, at 13.
33. Id. at 101.
34. TIME, supra note 2, at 59.
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in every phase of modem life. In a time much shorter than was
necessary for the auto to make the buggy-whip obsolete, the vacuum
tube and its successor, the transistor, gave way to integrated semi-
conductor devices.35 This rapid growth requires investment in re-
search and development (R & D) ,1 maintenance of substantial
physical facilites and commitment to continuing development pro-
grams. Companies that fall behind may drop out of the race, as did
giants such as RCA, GE and Philco37-who no longer manufacture
computers.(RCA still produces integrated circuits.)
In a setting so prone to change, advances in research and in
production techniques have great value but the attendant competi-
tive advantage is short-lived. In order to stay in the race, companies
rely on secrecy to protect their own technology and must try to
penetrate the secrecy shielding the technology of their competitors.
As a result of such pressures a business atmosphere develops in
which employees shift companies frequently or withdraw to form
their own firms. 5 The president of one semiconductor company in
Silicon Valley stated that all a prime engineer or designer needs to
do to change jobs "is drive down the same street in the morning and
turn in a different driveway.""9
The semiconductor industry expects that this atmosphere of
pressure and change will persist. As the technology becomes more
intricate and employee mobility remains fluid, the difficulty of pro-
tecting trade secrets presents special legal problems. The legal sys-
tem is challenged to devise protection which can respond to rapid
changes in technology without stifling free enterprise or unreasona-
bly interfering with the freedom of individuals to pursue career
opportunities.
B. Chip Technology: Principles and Processes.
One of the most powerful applications of the chip is its use as
a memory component of a computer. At present, U.S.-Japanese
competition centers on marketing a reliable "64 K memory chip,"4
a chip on which is imprinted the equivalent of 65,5361' transistor
35. J. SoMA, supra note 8; TIME, supra note 2, at 55.
36. Commonly used abbreviations will be enclosed in parentheses following the names
and phrases they connote.
37. J. SoMA, supra note 8, at 136.
38. TME, supra note 2, at 51.
39. Id. More than half of each issue of the newsletter MICROELEcTRONIcS NEWS, supra
note 5, is devoted to notices of job offerings and corporate changes among the semiconductor
experts in Silicon Valley.
40. FoRTUNE, supra note 1, at 79.
41. Noyce, supra note 29, at 9.
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circuits. Each microscopic circuit is used to store and retrieve the
smallest unit of information - a "bit". These circuits are most con-
veniently visualized as switches. To visualize the connection be-
tween bits and switches, one must note that computers store infor-
mation in the form of binary numbers. Ordinary arithmetic uses a
decimal number system with ten digits ranging from zero to nine.
Binary arithmetic uses 'a number system with only two digits
"ranging" from zero to one. Just as the number of dollars in a bank
account is represented by a string of decimal digits, for example 209,
the same number is represented in the binary bystem as 11010001.42
Since each element of a binary number must be either a "zero" or
a "one", the two possibilities comprising a bit, the same information
contained in a string of bits can be characterized by a string of
"offs" or "ons": the words we use to describe the positions of a
switch. Thus numerical information that we are accustomed to re-
cord as strings of digits, each bearing the possible labels "zero"
through "nine", may be translated into "switch" language as
(longer) strings of digits each bearing the possible labels "off" or
"on". Everyone has seen the strings of lights that dramatically blink
"on" and "off" on computers shown in movie films. The changes in
configuration of the lights are usually accompanied by dramatic
clicks or staccato music that connote the processing of information.
Each particular configuration of lights in their "on" or "off" posi-
tions contains the same information as a particular binary number
composed of zeroes and ones. The same light configuration
"displays" the corresponding "on" or "off" positions of the array of
switches that stores this binary information.
In order to store and retrieve information by means of arrays
of switches, a mechanism for setting or resetting each switch (stor-
ing a bit) and for determining the switch setting without changing
it (reading the bit of information stored) is needed. One such mech-
anism for setting or resetting switches consists of an electrical cur-
rent (a flow of electrons) between two points in an electrical circuit.
Setting (or resetting) can be accomplished by causing the switch
either to allow or to interrupt the current flow between the two
points. Reading can be accomplished by observing whether or not
current is flowing. (In the "blinking lights" computer described
above, the light is "on" when the current is flowing and "off" when
it is interrupted).
42. Holton, The Large Scale Integration of Microelectronic Circuits, in
MICROELEcONIcs 26 (1977); TiM, supra note 2, at 56-58.
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Clearly, three elements are needed to control current flow -
the two points between which the current flows and a third point
(which can be visualized as and usually is located between the
other two) that causes the flow to commence or cease. In simple
transistor switches, these three elements are fabricated in the
form of a "sandwich" of semiconductor materials.43 (The word
"semiconductor" implies that in its pure form or unexcited state the
material does not easily allow the passage of electrons through it.
In contrast, materials like copper, silver and gold offer much less
resistance to the passage of electrons and are therefore called
"conductors."44)
A "64 K chip" contains 65,536 such semiconductor sandwich
switches with connections for setting and reading each switch.45
Since these rectangular chips are about one-quarter inch on a side,4"
one appreciates the remarkable precision required to produce them
properly, i.e., without imperfections that cause "open" or "short"
circuits in the microscopic switches. In order to achieve such tech-
nological wonders, years of research by armies of researchers were
required. Their efforts led to workable but highly refined and so-
phisticated production processes. These processes include:47 (1) pro-
ducing "razor-thin wafers of precisely polished silicon about three
inches in diameter" sliced from "extremely pure (99.9%) crystalline
silicon grown somewhat like rock candy", (2) carefully impregnating
("doping") the pure silicon in 2,000 degree ovens with minute
amounts of artfully determined impurities, (3) depositing thin lay-
ers of insulating and photosensitive materials on the wafers, (4)
imprinting the electronic circuitry on the photosensitive layers by
means similar to the development of photographs, i.e., shining
ultra-violet radiation (or x-rays or electron beams) through masks
(like photographic negatives), (5) etching away the parts of the layer
exposed to the radiation and hardening the unexposed parts that
outline the circuitry, and (6) rebaking and repeating the previous
steps for each of several layers of integrated circuits.
Auxiliary but equally sophisticated parts of the process are the
techniques of growing crystals, cutting wafers, designing and mak-
ing masks, reducing and duplicating the masks so as to produce
43. Meindl, Microelectronic Circuit Elements, in MICROELECTRONICS 12, 15 (1977).
44. Id. at 13.
45. Sutherland & Mead, Microelectronics and Computer Science, in MICROELECTRONICS
110, 112-113 (1977).
46. Id. at 114; TIME, supra note 2, at 44-45.
47. More detailed descriptions of these processes may be found in Oldham, The Fabrica-
tion of Microelectronic Circuits, in MICROELECTRONICS 41 (1977) and, (in simpler terms) TIME,
supra note 2, at 56.
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about 250 images on a three-inch wafer, cutting the wafer into the
250 chips, and testing the finished product so as to assure that the
microscopic circuitry performs as designed and has not been dam-
aged by a single dust speck or imperfection in masking or exposing
the surfaces.18
This chip technology is already obsolescent and became so al-
most as soon as it was developed.49 Already somewhere between the
drawing board and mass production are memory components with
more storage capability and faster storage and retrieval. These new
products are based on concepts different from those underlying the
transistor switch system. The next generation of memory compo-
nents,which is expected on the market in the 1980's, may apply
presently experimental models bearing such exotic names as
"magnetic bubble memories" or "Josephson junctions." These
terms may then become familiar expressions in our language.51 Pos-
sible improvements on current memory technology would far sur-
pass the present primitive state of the art. Even the largest comput-
ers anticipated for the next generation will not be able to store more
than a tiny fraction of the information stored in a single DNA mole-
cule. -" To people who have come to expect the products of technol-
ogy again to surpass the products of nature, it is an irony verging
on insult that their most advanced memory systems are so inferior
to those produced by the accidents of natural evolution. This inferi-
ority is a spur continually urging the invention of better memories
and processing systems.
Under the pressures of technology developing at so rapid a rate
and with the rewards so high for the first at any stage to develop
the next major advance, it may be a long time before the computer
industry and its component manufacturers reach a stable level of
competition. When that stage is reached, secrecy is necessary
mainly for considerations of styling, as now seems to be the case for
autos and transistor radios. In the meantime, the current competi-
tive stresses that urge the leading manufacturers to ever greater
inventiveness, may also be expected to urge them to develop more
aggressive,52 complicated and subtle methods of protecting their
own know-how and of acquiring the know-how of their competitors.
48. Time, supra note 2, at 56.
49. Id. at 50.
50. Hodges, Microelectronic Memories, in MICaOELECTRONICS 54, 61-62 (1977); TIME,
supra note 2, at 58.
51. TIME, supra note 2, at 58.
52. Kay, Microelectronics and the Personal Computer, in MIocRaOEiEoNcs 124, 134
(1977); Noyce, supra note 29, at 9; Oliver, The Role of Microelectronics in Instrumentation,
in MICROELECTRONICS 90, 91 (1977).
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II1. PROTECTION OF TRADE SECRETS
A. Legal protection in the United States
1. Patent v. Trade Secrets Protection.
An industrial process5 3 may be protected by federal patent.54
Patent law is designed to encourage disclosure of discoveries and
inventions, by granting a limited monopoly of seventeen years to the
inventor, 5 thereby stimulating industry with the infusion of new
products. An inventor may prefer to protect an invention by main-
taining its secrecy rather than permit the disclosure required on
grant of patent." An invention or process which is sufficiently novel
to qualify for a patent grant may not be patented because the owner
prefers to keep it secret." In an industry of rapid technological
growth such as the computer industry,59 a trade secret submitted for
patent protection might well be obsolete before the patent could be
granted. There may be a considerable interval between applying for
and receiving a patent, while obsolescence in computer technology
occurs in a shorter interval. 0 Therefore much technical know-how
remains outside of the federal patent system when that system does
not offer suitable protection.
While federal patent law confers on the inventor the right to
exclude others from using the product, design or invention, it re-
quires disclosure. Where the element of secrecy is of paramount
importance, the protection afforded trade secrets and know-how by
common law is preferable to that of federal patent law. At common
law, developers of processes or ideas are not granted exclusive use
or limited monopolies but they are free to keep their secrets." An
owner, however, must take adequate precautions to safeguard se-
crets. Where a company has allowed unrestricted disclosure to out-
siders, the secrecy element of its trade secrets may successfully be
challenged.6 2 If a company fails to protect its trade secrets by an
53. Sometimes a patentable industrial process in the semiconductor industry provides a
commercial advantage if not disclosed to competitors; it may then be better protected as a
trade secret than as a patented invention.
54. 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-293 (1952).
55. United States v. American Bell Tel. Co., 167 U.S. 224 (1897).
56. 35 U.S.C. § 154.
57. Lyon & Doi, supra note 27, at 30.
58. 12A BusiNEsss ORGANIZATIONS, MILRIM, TRADE SECRETS, § 8.02 [1] (1978).
59. See p. 9, supra.
60. Hodges, supra note 30; Noyce, supra note 29.
61. Dunlavey, Protection of the Inventor Outside the Patent System, 43 CALIF. L. REv.
457 (1955).
62. Crown Indus., Inc. v. Kawneer Co., 335 F. Supp. 749 (N.D. Ill. 1971); National
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effective secrecy program, 3 the information may lose its secret sta-
tus and common law protection. Because there are many different
definitions of what constitutes a trade secret or know-how, there is
some uncertainty in what data, techniques, or processes are entitled
to protection under the common law. 4 Despite the lack of general
agreement on definitions, the following guidelines for trade secret
identification have been developed. (1) A trade secret must be es-
sential to production and must reflect minimal novelty;65 (2) pro-
cesses will not be protected if they are common practice in the
industry;6 (3) the element of secrecy must be firmly established; "
and (4)the high degree of invention required for patents is not neces-
sary for trade secret protection. 8 Many of the manufacturing pro-
cesses of Silicon Valley companies meet all the requirements for
classification as trade secrets. As indicated above, 9 because of the
nature of semiconductor technology, the industry's trade secrets
benefit more from common law protection than from patent protec-
tion.
2. Federal vs. State Protection
Protection against the wrongful acquisition or use of another's
trade secret is primarily a matter of state law.70 The doctrine of
preemption of state law by federal law, as it applies to trade secret
cases, was developed in three well-known cases in the 1960's.1' These
decisions favored the application of federal law in trade secret cases.
The conflict between the federal government's authority to encour-
age invention by granting patents and the states' power to legislate
other incentives and protections for similar purposes was finally
Starch Prods., Inc. v. Polymar Indus., Inc., 79 N.Y.S.2d 357 (1948).
63. Motorola, Inc. v. Fairchild Camera & Instrument Corp., 366, F. Supp. 1173 (D. Ariz.
1973); J.T. Healy & Son, Inc. v. James A. Murphy & Son, Inc., 357 Mass. 728, 260 N.E.2d
723 (1970).
64. DESSEMONTEr, supra note 25, at 20-24.
65. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470 (1974); Ungar Elec. Tools, Inc. v. Sid
Ungar Co., 192 Cal. App. 2d 398, 13 Cal. Rptr. 268 (1961); By-Buk Co. v. Printed Cello-
phane Tape Co., 163 Cal. App. 2d 157, 329 P.2d 147 (1958).
66. Winston Research Corp. v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 350 F.2d 134 (9th Cir.
1965).
67. A. BROWNE, TRADE SEcRErs AND UNFAIR COMPEITION 47-51 (1977).
68. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470 (1974).
69. See pp. 8-9 supra.
70. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 980-84 (Deering 1971); DESSEMONTET, supra note 25, at 239; Dun-
lavey, supra note 61, at 458-59.
71. Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653 (1969); Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc.,
376 U.S. 234 (1964), rehearing denied, 377 U.S. 913 (1964); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel
Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964), rehearing denied, 377 U.S. 913 (1964).
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resolved in Kewanee v. Bicron.72 The court in Kewanee held that the
states may enact laws to protect trade secrets without impinging on
authority reserved to the federal patent system. The result of the
Kewanee holding is that states may enact laws to protect business
conducted within the state.
3. Legal Protection Available
a. Employment Contracts
Trade secrets can be protected by express or implied73 contracts
not to divulge secret material. Most large corporations and business
avail themselves of some form of employee contract,74 while smaller
ones may rely on rights under equity rather than express contracts. 7
In the closely-knit semiconductor industry of Silicon Valley7 a
pervasive trade secret problem confronts employers because of rapid
employee turnover. An employee may transfer technical know-how
by memorizing secret design data or production processes and di-
vulging such knowledge to a subsequent employer. The industry
restricts these practices by use of employee contracts7 7 which limit
the kind of information that can be passed on by former employees
to new employers. An employer is prevented, however, from placing
complete restraints on an employee who terminates employment
and then works for a competitor. Unlimited restraints are not per-
mitted because they would hinder the employee from lawfully
pursuing an occupation and earning an income.71
Reasonable restrictive covenants are not illegally in restraint of
trade79 and may augment common law secrecy protection."0 An ex-
press written contract can be used to put an emjloyee on notice of
his position of trust by setting forth (1) the confidential nature of
the employer-employee relationship, (2) the categories of informa-
72. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470 (1974).
73. Motorola, Inc. v. Fairchild Camera & Instrument Corp., 366 F. Supp. 1173 (D. Ariz.
1973); Choisser Research Corp. v. Electronic Vision Corp., 173 U.S.P.Q. 234, 236, note 4
(Calif. Super. Ct., 1972).
74. 12 MILGRIM, supra note 15, at § 3.02.
75. DESSEMONTET, supra note 25, at w99.
76. See note 39, supra.
77. See Note this issue at
78. Muggill v. Reuben H. Donnelley Corp., 62 Cal. 2d 274, 398 P.2d 147, 42 Cal. Rptr.
107 (1965); CAL. Bus. & PROF. ConE § 16600 (Deering 1976); BROWNE, supra note 67, at
15-16.
79. 12 MILGRIM, supra note 15, at § 3.02[1].
80. Maloney v. E.I. duPont de Nemours Co., 352 F.2d 936, 938 n. 4 (D.C. Cir., 1965);
Conmar Prods. Corp. v. Universal Slide Fastener Co., 172 F.2d 150 (2d Cir. 1940); Warner-
Lambert Pharmaceutical Co. v. John J. Reynolds, Inc., 178 F. Supp. 655 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
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tion to be treated as trade secrets and (3) a covenant not to com-
pete.81 In the event of wrongful disclosure, the written agreement is
useful evidence that the employee was aware of a fiduciary responsi-
bility.82 The reasonableness of a written agreement is determined by
analyzing all of the surrounding circumstances in a given situation.
Courts frequently look to circumstances such as territorial restric-
tions,83 duration of the non-competition covenant 4 and extent of the
prohibition8. when determining reasonableness.
Written employment covenants have several drawbacks: they
seldom can cover every aspect of an employment arrangement and
if they are drawn too broadly, they may be rejected by the courts."
Conversely, if the contract is drawn too narrowly, the courts may
hesitate to imply more protection than was expressly stated in the
contract.87 Where the written contract contains no express provision
for secrecy, a duty not to divulge trade secrets may be implied.sU
There are also psychological disadvantages to compulsory use
of employee contracts. Employees may resent having to attest to
their loyalty. Additionally, it may be unwise to emphasize the value
of certain information as this may give rise to larcenous notions
where none previously existed.89
A quasi" contract theory may also be used as a basis of recovery
for wrongful disclosure.9" The owner of a trade secret has a property
right in the secret. Courts may use the equitable remedy of quasi-
contractual recovery to protect this right by preventing the em-
ployee from divulging trade secrets.2
The problem of drafting employment contracts in the semicon-
81. 12 MILGRIM, supra note 15, at § 3.02[1].
82. Go-Van Consolidators, Inc. v. Piggy Back Shippers, Inc., 111 R.I. 697, 306 A.2d 164
(1973).
83. Eutectic Corp. v. Astralloy-Vulcan Corp., 510 F.2d 1111, 1115 (5th Cir. 1975); Delta
Corp. v. Sebrite Corp., 391 F. Supp. 638, 641-42 (E.D. Tenn. 1974).
84. Eutectic Corp. v. Australloy-Vulcan Corp., 510 F.2d 1111, 1115 (5th Cir. 1975);
Leavitt Co. v. Plattos, 27 Ill. App. 3d 598, 327 N.E.2d 356, 359-60 (1975).
85. Eutectic Corp. v. Astralloy-Vulcan Corp., 510 F.2d 1111, 1115 (5th Cir. 1975); Bur-
roughs Corp. v. Cimakasky, 346 F. Supp. 1398, 1400 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
86. Reading Aviation Serv., Inc. v. Bertolet, 454 Pa. 488, 311 A.2d 628, 630 (1973).
87. Trilog Assocs., Inc. v. Famularo, 455 Pa. 243, 314 A.2d 287 (1974).
88. Mitchell Metal Prods., Inc. v. Berkeley Equip. Co., 36 F. Supp. 1010, 1012 (W.D.
Pa. 1941).
89. 12 MILGRIM, supra note 15, at § 3.02 [2].
90. Kewanee Oil Co., 416 U.S. 470 (1974).
91. Pressed Steel Car Co. v. Standard Steel Car Co., 210 Pa. 464, 60 A. 4 (1904); 12
MILGRIM, supra note 15, at § 4.02.
92. Plant Indus., Inc. v. Coleman, 287 F. Supp. 636, 641 (C.D. Cal. 1968); By-Buk Co.
v. Printed Cellophane Tape Co., 163 Cal. App. 2d 157, 329 P.2d 147 (1958); Miller v. Schloss,
218 N.Y. 400, 113 N.E. 327 (1916).
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ductor industry where employees are extremely mobile is challeng-
ing and satisfactory results are difficult to obtain.9 3 Major competi-
tors cluster in a small geographical area and draw from a common
pool of specialized technicians. The confined geography and high
mobility in the industry limit the effectiveness of employment con-
tracts in trade secret protection.
b. Licensing Agreements
Trade secrets and know-how are regarded as property which
may either be sold outright or licensed to manufacturers who wish
to use the process. 5 Licensing can be accomplished without destroy-
ing the secret nature of the information. The licbnsor can draft an
express provision of secrecy into the license agreement" limited to
a given number of years. A provision by which a licensor can con-
tinue to receive royalties beyond the period of secrecy specified by
such a license agreement affords more protection than the exclusiv-
ity conferred by a patent. This feature distinguishes licensing from
patent protection. Furthermore, even without an express provision
of secrecy, some courts are willing to imply that trade secrets re-
ceived in confidence in a licensing or prelicensing conference are to
be protected because of the relationship of trust under which they
were disclosed.98
The effectiveness of a licensing agreement in protecting trade
secrets and know-how depends in large measure on how carefully
the instrument is drafted. A well-drawn license protects the prop-
erty right of an owner of a trade secret who does not wish to engage
in production and elects instead to license the trade secret.9 As in
the case of employment contracts, it is very difficult to draft a
license agreement so as to afford maximum protection to trade se-
crets.'0
93. See p. 10, supra.
94. Id.
95. Painton & Co. v. Bourns, Inc. 442 F.2d 216, 223, 225-26 (2d Cir. 1971); 12 MILGRIM,
supra note 15, at § 1.06.
96. Lyon & Doi, supra note 27, at 73.
97. Sinclair v. Aquarius Elecs., Inc., 42 Cal. App. 3d 216, 227-28, 116 Cal. Rptr. 654, 661-
62 (1974).
98. Allen-Qualley Co. v. Shellmar Prods. Co., 31 F. 2d 293 (N.D. Ill.), affrd, 36 F.2d 623
(7th Cir. 1929), 87 F.2d 104, 3211 S.P.Q. 24 (7th Cir. 1936), cert. denied, 301 U.S. 695 (1937).
99. 12 MILGRm, supra note 15, at § 1.06.
100. Lyon & Doi, supra note 27, at 70-74.
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c. Criminal Law Theories
Trade secrets are regarded as property for purposes of licensing
and, as in the case of tangible property, theft of trade secrets is
covered by state'"' and federal" 2 criminal law statutes.
Federal provisions enacted by Congress prohibit the transporta-
tion or sale or receipt of stolen goods valued at $5000 or more.
Despite the narrow construction given criminal statutes, the term
"goods" has been held to include intangibles. 03 "Stolen goods" are
broadly interpreted'04 and include "all felonious takings with the
intent to deprive the owner of the rights and benefits of ownership,
regardless of whether or not the theft constitutes common-law lar-
ceny." 05
The statutes of two major industrialized states, New York and
New Jersey, have served as models for many other state criminal
laws which protect trade secrets.' California with some slight mod-
ifications has followed the New Jersey model. The California Penal
Code 101 has been invoked in trade secret litigation involving the
computer industry but no appellate decision has yet appeared to
test the interpretation of the statute. 8
Federal and state criminal statutes may have some deterrent
effect on theft of technology but, in a most practical sense, prosecu-
tion of trade secret theft will not redress the harm. Large, heavily
capitalized firms can sustain some loss by theft but when trade
secrets or know-how are stolen from medium-sized or small busi-
nesses, criminal prosecutions offer empty comfort. The large firm
can more readily absorb a loss by theft which in a small company
would represent a substantial loss of business advantage. The crimi-
nal sanctions might be more effective for both large and small com-
panies if they were combined with civil actions which may in addi-
tion provide injunctive relief or civil remedies. 00 Criminal prosecu-
tion at either the federal or state level could be initiated if indeed a
case of theft of trade secrets were found. Inherent difficulties of
proof and limited relief which criminal sanctions offer narrow the
101. CAL. PENAL CODE § 499c (Dearing 1971).
102. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2314, 2315 (1976).
103. In re Vericker, 446 F.2d 244, 248 (2d Cir. 1971); United States v. Lester, 282 F.2d
750 (3d Cir. 1960); 12 MILGRIM, supra note 15, at § 1.1012][AI.
104. 18 U.S.C. § 2314 (1977).
105. United States v. Turley, 352 U.S. 407, 417 (1957); 12 MILGRIM, supra note 15, at §
1.10121.
106. 12 MILGRIM, supra note 15, at § 1.1011].
107. CAL. PENAL CODE § 499c (Deering 1971).
108. 12 MILGRIM, supra note 15, at § 1.1011], n. 31.1.
109. Id.
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applicability of criminal law to the most blatant cases of trade
secret theft.
d. Tort Law Theories
Tort law theories of protection for trade secrets are typically
based on the confidential relationship which exists between em-
ployer and employee."' The owner of a trade secret may alterna-
tively invoke tort actions based on breach of confidential relation-
ship, breach of fiduciary duty, interference with prospective eco-
nomic advantage or interference with contractual relations,"' and
perhaps, the creative but hitherto untried area of invasion of the
right to privacy."12
In complex technological fields of industrial development where
highly trained specialists are employed in areas of sensitive research
and development, the courts have recognized that there is a very
subtle distinction between the individual, skilled competence of an
employee and the proprietary interest in trade secrets of an em-
ployer."' The confidential nature of the relationship is regarded as
a shield to protect the employer from detrimental usurpation of
privileged information by the employee.' But the confidential rela-
tionship cannot be used to deprive the employee of job mobility or
to hinder his ability to be gainfully employed."'
In California, the owner of a trade secret is also protected by a
statute"' which provides that a trade secret developed by an em-
ployee is the property of the employer. The statute applies
whether the trade secret was lawfully or unlawfully acquired ' 7 and
it could conceivably be extended to cover a broader range of trade
secrets.""
e. California: Business and Professions Code
The regulation of unfair business practices in the United States
110. Olschewski v. Hudson, 87 Cal. App. 282, 262 P. 43 (1927).
111. BROWNE, supra note 67, at 15.
112. DESSEMONTET, supra note 25, at 351-53.
113. E. I. duPont de Nemours & Co. v. American Potash & Chemical Corp., 41 Del. Ch.
533, 200 A.2d 428 (1964).
114. Ungar Elec. Tools, Inc. v. Sid Ungar Co., 192 Cal. App. 2d 398, 13 Cal. Rptr. 268
(1961).
115. Sarkes Tarzian, Inc. v. Audio Devices, Inc., 166 F. Supp. 250, 264 (S.D. Cal. 1958);
Futurecraft Corp. v. Clary Corp., 205 Cal. App. 2d 279, 23 Cal. Rptr. 198 (1962); Wexler v.
Greenberg, 399 Pa. 569, 160 A.2d 430 (1960).
116. CAL. LAB. CODE § 2860 (Deering 1976).
117. Southern Cal. Disinfectant Co. v. Lomkin, 183 Cal. App. 2d 431, 7 Cal. Rptr. 43
(1960).
118. Daniel Orifice Fitting Co. v. Whalen, 198 Cal. App. 2d 791, 18 Cal. Rptr. 659 (1962).
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is largely a concern of equity."9 California has specifically provided
by statute that dishonest business practices and trade practices' 21
constituting unfair competition are illegal.'2 ' Historically, the ra-
tionale used in protecting against unfair competition was that it
would be unjust to allow one to profit from another's labor. 22
Unfair competition is a broad concept and there is no complete,
definitive list of practices considered unfair. 2 3 The standards are
flexible and change as public policy changes.'2 ' Protections ad-
vanced by the Business and Professions Code in California and by
antitrust provisions discussed below in the context of federal and
state antitrust law may be useful to the semiconductor industry.
The utility may be limited to firms that can afford the time and
money to engage in complex antitrust litigation.
f. Antitrust
Antitrust provisions of the Sherman Act'?- forbid unreasonable
restraints on interstate trade or commerce. The Clayton Act and the
Robinson-Patman Act'2 1 forbid price discrimination intended to
lessen competition or establish a monopoly. Some forms of misap-
propriation of industrial know-how have been considered a form of
dishonest competition which fall within the area protected by anti-
trust legislation.'2 The conflict between the public nature of anti-
trust proceedings and the retention of secrecy in litigating a trade
secret case is eased by the court's discretionary application of
appropriate in camera protection.'2  Liability under federal anti-
trust laws carries the heavy sanction of treble damages, attorney's
fees and the possibility of injunctive relief.' 2
In California, the Business and Professions Code contains two
specific provisions designed to regulate antitrust activity: the Car-
119. DESSEMONTET, supra note 25, at 342-51.
120. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 17000-17001 (Deering 1976).
121. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17200 (Deering 1976).
122. International News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 239-40 (1918).
123. Ojala v. Bohlin, 178 Cal. App. 2d 292, 2 Cal. Rptr. 919 (1960).
124. Southern Cal. Disinfectant Co. v. Lomkin, 183 Cal. App. 2d 431, 7 Cal. Rptr. 43
(1960).
125. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1976).
126. 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1976).
127. 12 MILGRIM, supra note 15, at § 6.05.
128. U.S. v. I.B.M. Mach. Corp., 1975 CCH Trade Cas. 1 60,311 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). See
also 15 U.S.C. § 30 (1976); FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(7).
129. Sherman Act., 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1976); Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 15, 26 (1976).
[Vol. 2
Legal Implications of Unfair Practices
twright Act 3" and the Unfair Practices Act.13' The Cartwright Act
is aimed at practices which would restrict trade, prevent competi-
tion or fix prices. Contracts drawn in violation of the Cartwright Act
are void. 12 The Unfair Practices Act bans discrimination by geo-
graphic region when the practice is intended to destroy competi-
tion.' 33 This act also prohibits below-cost sales, "loss leaders," secret
rebates, threats, boycotts or intimidating tactics which are designed
to eliminate competitive business. 134 Both California acts provide for
injunctive relief, treble damages and attorney's fees.
B. Legal Protection in Japan
1. Brief History of Trade Secret Law in Japan and Contrast with United
States Law
In the middle of the 19th century, when Japan abandoned its
isolationist policies, its domestic industry had not advanced beyond
the level of cottage industry. 13 Beginning with the 1885 Patent Mo-
nopoly Act,' 31 Japanese industry first sought to modernize itself by
the importation and use without modification of Western technol-
ogy and know-how. 37 This initial period of development continued
until about 1910. The next stage was marked by Japanese modifica-
tion and improvement of the imported technology. The most recent
development, which began around 1950 and continues to the pres-
ent, finds Japan fully industrialized and undergoing rapid progress
in domestic and imported technology.' 3 As a result, Japan not only
has had to absorb the technology of industrialized nations and to
develop indigenous industry, but also has been required to adopt
ways of protecting trade secrets at home and abroad.
Japanese law is based on western European civil law and has
been influenced by Chinese law and local customary law.'3' In the
decades since World War II, American law and business practices
130. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 16720 (Deering 1976).
131. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17O40e (Deering 1976).
132. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 16722, 16726 (Deering 1976).
133. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17040 (Deering 1976).
134. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 17043-17049 (Deering 1976).
135. Suzuki, The Importance of Patents in Developing Countries for the Encouragement
of Inventiveness and Industrial Research and Development, in W.I.P.O. COLOMBO SYMPOSIUM
121, at 122 (1977).
136. Id. at 122.
137. Id. at 124.
138. Id.
139. A. WISE, TRADE SECRETS AND KNow-How THROUGHOUT THE WORLD, at § 1.01[21
(1976) [hereinafter cited as WISE].
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have altered the Japanese legal climate."' Japanese businessper-
sons dealing in the United States must comprehend federal and
state systems as Well as the Anglo-American reliance on judge-made
case law. Conversely, Americans doing business with Japanese ind-
dustry need to be aware that the Japanese legal system is structured
around a Constitution and Codes (civil, civil procedure, commer-
cial, penal and criminal procedure), as well as special statutes and
regulations.' The case law in Japan involving trade secrets is of
limited value as precedent.4 2
Two important influences on Japanese law are legal commen-
tary and administrative guidance.' Legal commentary consists of
the writings and opinions of legal scholars, law professors and mem-
bers of the judiciary. Such commentary is not technically a source
of law but, absent positive law on a given point, the authority of legal
commentary in Japan is considered compelling.'
Administrative guidance, which has no precise counterpart in
American law, is difficult to define precisely since it consists of both
formal and informal influences exercised by any or all government
agencies on business practice. Administrative guidance over persons
and organizations is persuasive rather than coercive and its influ-
ence is particularly powerful in the area of foreign trade."' Large
companies frequently hire former government officials to insure a
flexible liaison with various important administrative bodies (i.e.,
Ministries of Finance, Trade and Industry; Fair Trade Commis-
sion; Bank of Japan).'4 The role of administrative guidance is to
secure the cooperation of business and industry in the advancement
of administrative goals. Failure to comply with the suggested
"cooperation" sometimes reveals that guidance is something of an
iron fist in a velvet glove. 47
140. Id.
141. Id. §§ 101[31-101[51.
142. Lyon & Doi, supra note 27, at 31.
143. Narita, Administrative Guidance (from an article appearing in 4 Gendaiho 131-68
(1966), LAW IN JAPAN, vol. 2 (1968) 45-46, as cited in WISE, supra note 139, at §§ 1.0117],
1.01[81 n. 66.
144. WISE, supra note 139, at §§ 1.01[7], 1.05[1]. The role of legal commentary was
especially important until recent times because court decisions did not include facts of the
case or the court's reasoning in arriving at a decision.
145. Id. § 1.0118].
146. Id. § 1.01[8] n. 67.
147. Stevens, Japan's Legal System and Traditions, PROCEEDINGS OF A.B.A. NAT'L INSTI-
TUTE, SECTION OF INT'L LAW, 1972, at 9, as cited in WISE, supra note 139, at § 1.01[8], n. 67.
Stevens notes: "The business which ignores a Government suggestion might find that its
quota allocation for imported raw materials has been reduced; it might find that it cannot
get the necessary legal permissions for foreign exchange remittance needed in its business;
or it might be denied long-term Government financing for future expansions .. "
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The absence of a significant body of case law in Japan is par-
tially attributable to traditional reluctance to litigate: arbitration
and negotiation are the preferred techniques in Japanese business
and the prospect of litigation is regarded as the ultimate threat to
business relations.1 18 Until very recent times, lawyers were not
highly regarded and their presence at business meetings could seri-
ously jeopardize the preceedings.'4 9 A Japanese businessman would
interpret the presence of a lawyer at a conference as the overt ex-
pression of a hostile intention to sue rather than the desire to have
an advisor'10 present at the negotiations.
A United States company which has been harmed by illegal
activities of a Japanese competitor may wish to consider the reme-
dies available in Japan to determine whether an action could be
brought in that country. Two treaties signed by Japan and the
United States' 51 permit citizens of foreign signatory nations the
same access to Japanese courts, administrative tribunals and agen-
cies to redress their legal rights. (These treaties are described infra
in Section C.)
Under Japanese law, where contracting parties are of different
countries and do not specify which substantive law is to govern, the
court will apply the law of the offeror's domicile. 52 Thus, if a Japa-
nese corporation is the offeror in a contract with an American em-
ployee and no conflict of laws provision is expressed, a suit brought
in Japan on the contract will fall under Japanese substantive law'' 3
and Japanese contract remedies would apply (damages may be
awarded and may be combined with specific performance or rescis-
sion). '
2. Legal Protection Available
a. Constitution and Code
Japanese law protects property rights against confiscation
without compensation by the state.15 By extension and implication,
this same principle could be enforced against private persons who
confiscate private property by the unauthorized taking of know-
148. WISE, supra note 139, § 1.01[8], n. 68.
149. Id. § 1.0119], n.69.
150. Id. § 1.01[91, n. 70.
151. See section I, C.5., infra.
152. WIsE, supra note 139, at § 1.06[6].
153. Id..
154. Id. at § 1.09[1].
155. KENP5 (Constitution) art. XXIX, para. 3 (Japan).
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how. "'56 This application of the law is possible despite the fact that
know-how and trade secrets are not classified as property in the
Japanese Civil Code." 7 The Code only recognizes rights in real and
personal property, contracts and industrial property.'
Trade secrets are not included in the statutory definition of
industrial property'59 and the Civil Code does not deal elsewhere
with intangible property. 6 " If a trade secret is represented by some
concrete object which is possessed illegally, then its owners may
move to regain possession of the object or may seek injunctive relief
to prevent threatened disturbance of their possession.' Since trade
secrets and know-how are not always embodied in physical objects,
it is difficult to secure injunctive relief for those particular trade
secrets which are not identified in tangible form. 6 2 Trade secrets
and know-how are described as "interests having a property-like
character",'63 and while they cannot be treated as property in the
Civil Code, they can be protected under tort theories.'64 Few trade
secret cases have been recorded in Japan but there is one which
considers the question of trade secrets as "property". 5 The court's
conclusion in that case was that they are not property per se but are
something valuable like property.
The Japanese Commercial Code'66 does not recognize trade se-
crets as a protectible category of interests but a recent revision'67 of
the Code establishes that "goodwill" may be regarded as an asset
for accounting purposes. This provision has been interpreted to in-
clude know-how 6 ' which is not considered property but has value
that must be included in a business inventory'69 and in a compila-
tion of assets for income tax purposes.'7
156. WisE, supra note 139, at § 1.03 [2], [3].
157. Id. at § 1.03[3].
158. Id.
159. Yuhikaku, ThE NEw LAW DICTONARY 348 (1955), as cited in WsE, supra note 139,
at § 1.0317].
160. WISE, supra note 139, at § 1.0313].
161. Id.
162. Funabishi, "Bukkenho" [Law of Real Rights], 18 HORTSUGAKU ZENSHU 16-19
(1962), as cited in WIsE, supra note 139 at § 1.03[3].
163. "Zaisantaki hoeki," in WisE, supra note 139, at § 1.03[4].
164. Id. MIMP6 (Civil Code) art. 709 (Japan).
165. Deutsche Werft Aktiengesellschaft v. Chuetsu Waukesha Yugen Kaisha, Tokyo
High Court Decision, Sept. 5, 1966, 17 Kayu Minshu 769, 474 Hanrei Jiho (1967), as cited
in WISE, supra note 139 at § 1.0514].
166. SH6H6 (Commercial Code), Law No. 48 of 1899, as amended.
167. SH6H6 (Commercial Code), art. 285, para. 7 (Japan).
168. WISE, supra note 139, at § 1.0314].
169. Id.
170. Id. § 1.0316], 1.10.
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b. Employment Contracts
Employees can be bound by express or implied contracts to
honor the relationship of confidentiality between employer and
employee.' Breach of contract can subject the employee who
wrongfully divulges trade secrets to an action for damages and even
to injunctive restraints prohibiting competitive employment where
use of the former employer's trade secret is contemplated. 72
A fiduciary relationship between employer-employee may be
recognized in an implied contract and, in addition, Japanese law
extends the relationship of trust to the negotiation stage.'
c. Licensing Agreements
Patentable and unpatentable inventions, technical trade se-
crets and know-how are all interests which can be licensed to a
Japanese party.7 4 Licensing, unlike outright purchase, is uniquely
suited to the nature of trade secrets which often have optimum
value when first developed and declining value with the passage of
time. 7 5 One major benefit of licensing know-how is that the licensee
can acquire a process without investing the organization's time and
money for research and development.7 6 A licensor frequently re-
gards the license transaction as a way of avoiding litigation where
employee mobility presents multiple opportunities for trade secret
misappropriation and disclosure to competitors. 7 7 By licensing the
trade secret, the developer can recover some of the expense for re-
search and development and at the same time protect against expo-
sure and loss of secrecy.
License agreements, called "technological assistance con-
tracts" in Japan, need not take a particular form, but must be in
writing for purposes of validation by the Japanese government. 7 1
Licenses may be exclusive or non-exclusive 79 and extend usually
171. Id. § 1.06[2].
172. Yugen Kaisha Forseco Japan, Ltd. v. Okuno & Diamatsu, Nara District Court, Oct.
23, 1970, 624 Hanrei Jiho 78, cited in WIsE, supra note 139, at § 1,06[2]. Although two
employees were enjoined from working for a competitor because of the court "specifically
enforcing" a two-year covenant not to compete, Wise considers the case to be something of a
landmark.
173. See also A. VON ME_REN, THE CIVIL LAw SYSTEM 491-92 (1957).
174. WISE, supra note 139, at § 1.09.
175. Zentner, Exploitation of Trade Secrets by Licensing, in ATrORNm'S GUIDE TO
TRADE SECRETS 81, 86 (C. Brosnahan ed. 1971).
176. Id. at 86.
177. Id.; Law Concerning Foreign Investment, Law No. 163 of 1950, art. 3, para. 1(3).
178. WISE, supra note 139, at §1.09[1].
179. Id. § 1.09[5].
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from four to ten years. ' Although the scope of license agreements
is far too broad to be treated here, 8 1 we note here that licensing
agreements can be drawn with express security provisions covering
confidentiality of highly perishable know-how and employee mo-
bility. Provisions may be made for preserving confidentiality within
a geographic area and beyond the period of employment.
8 2
d. Criminal Law Theories
The Japanese Penal Code, adopted in 1907, is not one of the
better developed criminal codes of the civil law countries"' nor does
it compare favorably with most state codes in the United States.84
Even the proposed revision of the Penal Code' 5 contains no article
expressly protecting against theft of industrial secrets. No provision
in the Japanese Code corresponds to the Unfair Competition Laws
of the German and Swiss Codes,'8 good examples of modem civil
law systems with statutes protecting against unfair business prac-
tices. As late as 1969, Japan's Minister of Justice reportedly still did
not consider a law prohibiting industrial espionage to to be appro-
priate in the Code.' 7 In this context, Japan has a widely recognized
reputation for tolerance of industrial espionage among its corpora-
tions.' 8 Unofficial sources estimate that some 10,000 commercial
spies operate in Japan and that the Institute for Industrial Protec-
tion, a school specializing in industrial espionage techniques, has
trained many of them under the sponsorship of corporate employ-
ers.'18
Despite the fact that no provision of the Japanese Penal Code
specifically deals with trade secret theft,"' a measure of protection
is afforded indirectly by some of its Articles."' One article"°2 prohib-
180. Id. § 1.0912].
181. See generally Woodward & Matsuo, Drafting License Agreements in Japan and in
the U.S., in PATENT AND KNOW-How LICENSING IN JAPAN AND THE U.S., supra note 27, at
124-70.
182. WISE, supra note 139, at § 1.09[23], [30][f].
183. Id. § 1.04[1].
184. Id. 99 1.04[l], 1.01[4][d].
185. Takeuchi, A PREPARATORY DRAFT FOR THE REVISED PENAL CODE OF JAPAN (American
Series of Foreign Penal Codes, No. 8, 1961).
186. WISE, supra note 139, at §§ 1.04[1], [17].
187. Japanese Times, May 24, 1969, at 12, as cited in WISE, supra note 139, at §
1.04[17].
188. WISE, supra note 139, at § 1.0517].
189. Id.
190. Id. § 1.04[1].
191. KEIH6 (Penal Code) arts. 222, 233, 246, 247 (Japan).
192. KEIH6 (Penal Code) art. 134 (Japan).
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its unauthorized disclosures by persons presently or formerly em-
ployed in certain sensitive professions.'93
A criminal indictment for misappropriation of trade secrets
poses problems because it is not clear when use of the term
"property" as the subject matter of theft can refer to intangibles.'94
Articles covering larceny'95 and embezzlement'96 do not adequately
distinguish between theft of an intangible secret and theft of the
document in which the secret is embodied. If any employee were to
memorize details of a process and later transcribe them onto paper
already in his possession, it is doubtful that he could be punished
under Japanese criminal law.'97 In Japan v. George Telenchef,'"I a
Japanese trade secret case charging larceny, the court appears to
deal with the question of such intangibles as intellectual property,
but the resolution is unclear. The defendant, owner of a detective
agency, operated as an industrial spy and allegedly was hired by one
company to steal trade secrets of a competitor. The trade secrets
consisted of various documents and lists which the defendant and
accomplices acquired and reproduced on the plaintiff's copy ma-
chine using plaintiff's paper. The defendant urged that trade secrets
are intangible property not subject to larceny under the Penal
Code.199 The court rejected this defense and held that the secret
contents rather than the paper itself were stolen.2"9 As a result, at
least one authority201 has speculated that it would be difficult for a
Japanese court to find theft in a trade secret case that did not
involve a tangible representation of stolen information.
22
Similarly, in Japan v. Himei, 23 a conviction for embezzlement
was handed down in an employee's misappropriation of industrial
material and documents which were trade secrets. 24 When the court
recognized the value of the contents of the documents, it was willing
to extend its interpretation of property subject to theft to include
193. The professions listed in Keiho (Penal Code) art. 134 (Japan) are those of doctor,
pharmacist, druggist, midwife, lawyer, defense counsel and notary.
194. WISE, supra note 139, at § 1.04[3][141.
195. KEIH5 (Penal Code) art. 235 (Japan).
196. KEIH6 (Penal Code) art. 252, 253 (Japan).
197. Id. § 1.04[14][A].
198. Japan v. George Telenchef, 7 Kakyu Keishu 1319, 419 Hanrei Jiho 14 (Tokyo Dist.
Ct., June 26, 1965).
199. KEIH5 (Penal Code) art. 235 (Japan); See WISE, supra note 139 at § 1.04[3].
200. WISE, supra note 139, at § 1.04[14][a].
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id. § 1.04[141[b].
204. Id.
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trade secrets as well as the industrial materials and documents.2 11
Both Telenchefl00 and Himei2°7 involved Japanese citizens
whose criminal convictions for larceny and embezzlement resulted
from activities carried on within Japan. 28 Had they been charged
with committing these crimes or with receiving stolen property,
fraud or breach of trust outside Japan, they would still have been
subject to prosecution in Japan29 but the penalty under Japanese
law would have been modified. 21
e. Tort Law Theories.
Article 709 of the Japanese Civil Code sets out the basic premise
that intentional or negligent violation of the rights of another will
give rise to an action for damages. Misuse of trade secrets by
unauthorized disclosure or by misappropriation can be redressed by
bringing an action in tort. Few cases in Japan in the area of trade
secrets or know-how have been decided as tort cases.2 12 This infre-
quency of tort litigation is considered a contributing factor to the
low damage awards which are granted in Japan.213
The Law Prohibiting Unfair Competition2 1 1 contains one
clause215 which prohibits giving misleading information about the
"quality, contents, process, usage or quantity or goods". Presuma-
bly, this clause could be applied to trade secret misappropriation
cases but it has not been so used.216
Japanese tort actions require the following:
(1) an intentional or negligent act; (2) an unlawful violation of
205. Id.
206. Japan v. George Telenchef, 7 Kakyu Keishu 1319, 419 Hanrei Jiho 14 (Tokyo Dist.
Ct., June 26, 1965).
207. WISE, supra note 139, at § 104[14][b].
208. KEIH5 (Penal Code) art. 1 (Japan); th Penal Code applies to citizens and nonciti-
zens alike.
209. The following crimes committed by Japanese citizens abroad subject them to prose-
cution under the Japanese Penal Code: larceny (art. 235), embezzlement (art. 253), receiving
stolen property (art. 256, para. 2), fraud (art. 246), breach of trust (art. 247).
210. KmEH6 (Penal Code) art. 5 (Japan).
211. WISE, supra note 139, at § 1.0511].
212. Id.
213. WIsE, supra note 139, at § 1.0518]. In a suit brought by American Cyanamid Co.
against Nissan Chemical Industries, plaintiff asked for $277,788 in damages for patent in-
fringement which had generated $2 million of melamine production. The Japanese court
awarded 4% of the illegal production (some $79,795), an amount less than the potential
royalties.
214. Act No. 14 of 1934, as amended in 1965.
215. Id.
216. WIsE, supra note 139, at § 1.0516].
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another's right; (3) legal capacity; (4) proximate cause; and (5)
resulting damages." 7 These tort elements can be applied to one
who misuses trade secrets or know-how even if the tortfeasor did
not know that he was violating another's rights. 21
Knowledge that harm would ensue is sufficient. 2' 1 This interpreta-
tion allows a plaintiff to proceed against a defendant who wrongfully
acquires a trade secret as well as one who wrongfully appropriates
a trade secret.
In addition to awarding damages, a court may issue an injunc-
tion220 ordering the defendant to cease violation of the plaintiff's
rights. 22' Failure to comply with an injunctive order in Japan will
result in a penalty (money damages) but cannot result in imprison-
ment for contempt of court.2 2 Thus the impecunious party who fails
to heed an injunction cannot be reached. Since few trade secret
actions are brought in tort, the fact that injunctive relief is available
in such cases may be of little consequence. In one case dealing with
trade secrets, Deutsche Werft Aktiengesellschaft v. Chuetsu Wau-
kesha Yugenkaisha221 the court denied a provisional injunction be-
cause the suit was a tort and not a contract action. Judicial reluct-
ance to give injunctive relief in trade secret cases and generally low
awards in tort cases combine to discourage a foreign plaintiff from
proceeding in tort in Japan where non-residents and aliens are freely
permitted to bring suit.224
f. Japanese Antitrust Theories.
The Act Concerning Prohibition of Private Monopoly and
Maintenance of Fair Trade2 5 (hereinafter referred to as the Anti-
monopoly Act) was drafted using the Sherman, Clayton, Federal
Trade Commission and Robinson-Patman Acts as models. 22 The
217. Id. § 1.05[l].
218. Id. § 1.05[2].
219. Id.
220. MxMP5 (Civil Code) art. 414(3).
221. MINJI SHOSH6 H6 (Code of Civil Procedure) arts. 733, 734 (Japan); MIMP5 (Civil
Code) art. 414, para. 3 (Japan).
222. WIsE, supra note 139, at § 1.06[4] n.10.
223. WIsE, supra note 165, at § 1.05[4].
224. Neither the Civil Code nor the Code of Civil Procedure distinguishes between citi-
zens and non-citizens. MImpo (Civil Code) art. 2 (Japan). Additionally, Japan is a signatory
to the original Paris Convention of 1883 (Japan ratified in 1899) and its successor, World
Intellectual Property Organization of 1967: both organizations provide for protection of intel-
lectual property in international transactions, and members must offer the same protection
to foreign members as they would to citizens of their own country.
225. Act No. 54, 14 April 1947 (source: App. I).
226. Ariga, Regulation of International Licensing Agreements under the Japanese Anti-
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Anti-monopoly Act is designed to promote trade and to encourage
free competition by prohibiting monopolies, unfair business prac-
tices and trade restraints. The original Act 2  was stricter in its anti-
trust regulations than comparable American laws but later amend-
ments following the post-war occupation period 22 relaxed the sever-
ity of the Act.
The Antimonopoly Act can be applied to trade secret or know-
how licensing agreements that attempt to establish territorial or
export restrictions.2  The prohibition of unreasonable restraints of
trade20 extends to technology and is thus inclusive of trade secrets
and know-how. Again, as in other areas of Japanese law,U the appli-
cation of antitrust law to trade secret cases remains theoretical be-
cause no prosecutions have been brought under the Act.231
C. Protection on the International Level
A survey of protections against unfair competition on the inter-
national level indicates that such protections are at best impractica-
ble and at worst virtually illusory. The major obstacle to interna-
tional remedies for private United States corporations or industries
aggrieved by unfair foreign competition is the lack of private rights
of action.3 Since actions can be undertaken only by governments
in behalf of their injured constituents, it is first necessary to engage
the government in the dispute. Then the private complainant must
argue that the relief sought is in harmony with government policy
regarding such "disputes.3
The following summary of international protections offers a
basis for the conclusions that they provide limited practicability in
resolving Silcon Valley's complaints. The most promising of these
protections may be the imposition of countervailing duties.2 5 The
rationale for this inference can best be indicated after reviewing
other possible protections.
monopoly Law, in PATENT AND KNOW-How LEASING IN JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES, supra
note 27, at 278.
227. Enacted March 31, 1947.
228. Especially, Amendments of 1949 and 1953.
229. WIsE, supra note 139, at § 1.07[3].
230. Act No. 54, 14 April 1947, at 2(6), 3.
231. See notes 183-189, supra.
232. Inada, International "Know-How" Licensing and Territorial Restraint Clauses, 8
HARV. INT'L L. J. 247 (1967).
233. D. BowErr, THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS 1-11 (1963).
234. See section V.C., infra.
235. Id.
[Vol. 2
Legal Implications of Unfair Practices
1. The Trade Act of 1974211
On its face, the Trade Act of 1974 and earlier legislation it
amends appear to open a path to government action at the interna-
tional level.The Act's legislative intent includes the elimination of
barriers to trade "on a basis which assures substantially equivalent
competitive opportunities for the commerce of the United States,"2.7
the establishment of "fairness and equity in international trading
relations,"'238 and a provision for "adequate procedures to safeguard
American industry and labor against unfair or injurious import
competition."21 To implement this legislative intent, the Act pro-
vides for: (a) authority for the President to negotiate tariff modifica-
tions,240 (b) Presidential authority, subject to Congressional ap-
proval, to reducenon-tariff barriers, 24' and (c) protection of domes-
tic interests and compensation for injuries suffered due to import
competition.242
Among the Presidential prerogatives provided by the Trade Act
is the authority to terminate, or grant partial termination of, a
variety of trade agreements and to impose import surcharges.2 143 Au-
thority for the exercise of these Presidential prerogatives was estab-
lished even before the explicit provisions of the Trade Act of 1974.
In 1971, the President partially terminated a prior agreement by
raising duties ten percent and causing a partial reversion to previous
tariff rates. 44 In the case of United States v. Yoshida Inteinational,
Inc.,245 the Court of Customs and Patents Appeals held that altera-
tion of tariff rates was a valid exercise of authority delegated to the
President.
The Trade Act of 1974 also provides for extensive consultation
between the President and representatives of the private sector
through the Advisory Committee for Trade Negotiations (ACTN),
which is under the direction of the Special Representative for Trade
Negotiation (STR). 28 The STR has the rank of Ambassador Ex-
traordinary and his second-in-command has the rank of Ambassa-
236. 19 U.S.C. §§ 2101-2487 (1977).
237. 19 U.S.C. § 2102(2)(1977).
238. 19 U.S.C. § 2102(3)(1977).
239. 19 U.S.C. § 2102(4)(1977).
240. 19 U.S.C. §§ 2111-2119 (1977).
241. 19 U.S.C. § 2112 (1977).
242. 19 U.S.C. § 2135 (1977).
243. Id.
244. 36 Fed. Reg. 15,724 (1971).
245. 526 F.2d 560 (C.C.P.A. 1975).
246. 19 U.S.C. § 2171 (1977).
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dor.247 These high ranks suggest the legislative intent that the pri-
vate sector have strong liaison with the President through high-level
spokespeople.
It may be observed, without drawing conclusions here, that if
the semiconductor industry has in fact been injured by Japanese
unfair competition and if the obstacles to inducing government ac-
tion can be overcome, it would appear that the provisions of the
Trade Act of 1974 are sufficiently sophisticated and versatile to offer
ample opportunity for redress.
2. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 248
Although GATT has never been formally approved by the U.S.
Congress, it has "provided the essential structure for international
trade relations among most of the market economy industrialized
world. '249 GATT is more like an international treaty than an inter-
national organization, in that it establishes a common code of con-
duct in international trade.250 Since the conclusion of the Kennedy
Round of talks in 1967, GATT's Secretariat has prepared a detailed
inventory of non-tariff barriers to trade (NTBs) as an important
step in negotiating their reduction or elimination. These NTBs are
divided into five broad categories: 25'
1) Government Participation in Trade (production and export sub-
sidies, government procurement practices, state trading);
2) Customs and Administrative Entry Procedures (anti-dumping
and countervailing duties, valuation for customs purposes, cus-
toms classification, consular formalities);
3) Standards Applicable to Imported and Domestic Products
(safety and health product and testing standards, packaging, la-
beling, and marketing regulations);
4) Specific Limitations on Imports and Exports (quotas, discrimi-
natory agreements, export restraints, licensing, price supports);
and
247. Id.
248. General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 55 U.N.T.S. 187.
249. Jackson, The General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade, A LAwYER's GUIDE TO
INTERNATIONAL BusNEss TRANSACTIONS 41, 43 (W.. Surrey and D. Wallace eds. 1977) [the
article is hereinafter cited as Jackson; the book hereinafter cited as Surrey]. From its appear-
ance in 1947 until the Trade Act of 1974, GATT was the subject of six major negotiating
rounds, the last of which was the Kennedy Round of 1967. The Trade Act stimulated the
Tokyo Round.
250. D. BowgrT, supra note 233, at 106.
251. K. RYAN, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAw 37 (1975); Metzger and Dunn, Trade Agree-
ments Programs of The United States, SuRREY, at 14-15.
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5) Charges on Imports (prior deposits, credit restrictions on im-
porters, border tax adjustments, variable levies).
Categories 1) and 2) include Japanese NTBs of which the semicon-
ductor industry complains.252 GATT's own provisions have tried to
set standards for recognizing and dealing with such practices2 3 but
GATT also recognizes that they need attention in subsequent nego-
tiating rounds.
GATT is poorly suited for individual action. A penetrating view
of the lawyer's difficulties in using GATT to resolve private trade
problems is expressed by Professor J. H. Jackson:
The lawyer dealing with private transactions usually faces
GAIT and the public law of international trade with some trepida-
tion, principally because of the obscurity and the apparent com-
plexity of the subject. One has to admit candidly that GATT has
not been noted for its appreciation of the problems of law or the
problems of lawyers. During most of its existence, the GATT Sec-
retariat has not even had a legal staff. . . There has" been a
common, although perhaps misconceived, notion that lawyers are
not very useful or 'relevant' to problems of GATT ...
It is therefore not surprising to find, from time to time, legal
inconsistencies in the GATT system. . . . Furthermore, some of
the provisions of GATT have become outmoded. The difficulty of
amending GATT is so great, however, that rather than amend it
in order to bring the agreement into conformity with current prac-
tice, the inconsistencies between the practice and the original prin-
ciples of GATT are, indeed, simply 'tolerated.' Private parties or
their lawyers have generally not been given a forum in the GATT,
as they have in . . . the International Monetary Fund and the
World Bank. Yet, more and more it is recognized that the decisions
that GATT makes or does not make. . . affect an enormous num-
ber of people.lu
Articles XXII and XXIII relate to dispute settlement.25 Arti-
cle XXH requires that any contracting party must consult, when
asked, with any other contracting party with respect to any matter
affecting the operation of GATT. Article XXIII, entitled
"Nullification and Impairment," refers to measures which may be
taken against a contracting party who impairs the benefits of GATT
252. 5ee generally, supra notes 1, 2.
253. For example, art. VI(1) deals with dumping, art. VI(3) deals with countervailing
duties and art. XI deals with import quotas.
254. Jackson, supra note 249, at 43-44.
255. General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 55 U.N.T.S. 266.
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to another party. Since these articles are not models of clarity, we
quote a succinct summary of their operation.
Complaints of non-observance of the Treaty or that benefits of the
Treaty are 'nullified or impaired' are circulated to all members
and a 'consultation' occurs in which not only the 'plaintiff and
'defendant' Parties participate, but any other Party having an
interest in the issue. Failing a satisfactory solution by these means
a panel of conciliation is appointed by the Contracting Parties
which makes recommendations. If these are not accepted by the
'defendant,' the Contracting Parties can authorize the 'plaintiff to
retaliate by withdrawing concessions from the 'defendant.' This
has rarely proved necessary, and this points to the efficacy of this
form of consultation under the pressure of the opinion of the mem-
bership as a whole. There is no further appeal from this adjudica-
tion by the Contracting Parties: a dissatisfied Party is left with the
possibility of withdrawing from GATT."6
The central question is the meaning of "nullification or impair-
ment," since there is no opportunity for sanction or retaliation un-
less one or the other can be shown to exist.27 But "[t]hese terms
have been variously defined and may be so imprecise as to admit
of no satisfactory definition," 2 s so that parties claiming impairment
of Treaty benefits are subject to the vagaries of imprecise interpre-
tation.
On the whole, the machinery of GATT seems to offer meager
opportunity to Silicon Valley's complainants for redress of alleged
wrongs. It does, however, contain provisions for dispute resolution
and it also provides a forum in which "the pressure of the opinion
of the membership" can be applied to an offending party to the
Treaty (here, Japan). In spite of its limited effectiveness, GATT
may provide a recourse not found in other protective mechanisms
on the international level.
3. The Antidumping Law of the United States
Dumping is selling a product in an export market at a price
lower than that prevailing in the domestic market of the seller.25
This practice often occurs where the seller or producer has a pro-
tected home market, which may be the result of government inter-
256. D. Bow=Tr, supra note 233, at 135.
257. Jackson, supra note 249, at 50.
258. Id.
259. Clubb and Feller, The Antidumping Law of the United States, Surrey 89
[hereinafter cited as Clubb].
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vention (quotas, subsidies, high tariffs or private action (cartels or
monopolies) .260
Two statutes regulate dumping in the U.S., the antidumping
provisions of the Revenue Act of 1916261 and the Antidumping Act
of 192162 as amended. The first statute is an antitrust law imposing
"heavy civil and criminal penalties for foreign producers who sys-
tematically attempt to drive their competitors out of business. Be-
cause of difficulties in its enforcement, this statute has been rarely
used. 12 3 The second statute, the "primary tool employed to prevent
dumping .... ,, provides for the imposition of special dumping
duties on imported goods sold in the U.S. at less than fair value
(LTFV) if a U.S. industry "is being or is likely to be injured, or is
prevented from being established, by reason of importation of such
merchandise....,,265
The Antidumping Act does not require a showing of intent and
therefore would be applicable to the alleged injuries suffered by
domestic semiconductor producers without proof of misappropria-
tion of know-how or of the Japanese Government's support of its
industry. The essential requirements of a cause of action under the
Antidumping Act are sales at LTFV and injury to or prevention of
the establishment of United States industry. Since the sequence
and chronology of steps in a dumping case are elaborate and de-
tailed, they have been relegated to appendix A. Perusal of these
steps will readily reveal that redress through the Antidumping Act
is less practicable than by other legal mechanisms reviewed here.
4. The Countervailing Duty Law266
The Countervailing Duty Law is the name usually ascribed to
section 303 of the Tariff Act of 1930 as amended by the Trade Act
of 1974.267 This law permits the imposition of a special duty on
dutiable imported goods if their production, manufacture, or export
has been supported "directly or indirectly" by means of a "bounty
or grant" bestowed by a government or other entity.26 The Secretary
of the Treasury has responsibility for the Law's administration. 29
260. Id.
261. 15 U.S.C. § 72 (1978).
262. 19 U.S.C. 99 160-73 (1978).
263. Clubb, supra note 249, at 95-104.
264. Id. at 90.
265. 19 U.S.C. § 160(a)(1978).
266. 19 U.S.C. § 1303 (Supp. 1978).
267. Feller, Countervailing Duties, SURRE, supra note 249, at 123 [hereeinafter cited as
Felleri.
268. 19 U.S.C. § 1303(a)(Supp. 1978).
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This law is designed to countervail the trade advantage af-
forded foreign producers over United States' competitors, as a result
of bounty support.270The circumstances under which a countervail-
ing duty will be imposed depends strongly on whether a "bounty or
grant" has been bestowed upon the manufacture, production or
export of the challenged product.
"Bounty or grant" is not defined in the statute or implementing
regulations.2' In a 1919 decision 2 relating to an earlier countervail-
ing duty statute, the Supreme Court interpreted this phrase as fol-
lows:
The statute was addressed to a condition and its words must be
considered as intending to define it, and all of them - 'grant' as
well as 'bounty' - must be given effect. If the word 'bounty' has
a limited sense, the word 'grant' has not. A word of broader signifi-
cance than 'grant' could not have been used. Like its synonyms
'give' and 'bestow' it expresses a concession, the conferring of
something by one person upon another. And if 'something' be con-
ferred by a country 'upon exportation of any articles, or merchan-
dise' a countervailing duty is required ...
Another interpretation of the legislative intent was expressed in a
1936 Attorney General's Opinion: 27 3
It is plain from the statute itself that it was intended to anticipate
as inclusively as possible all practices and devices which might be
resorted to or invested to circumvent it by obscuring or concealing
their purposes as bounties or grants. The history of the Act fully
corroborates its purposes to make impossible its evasion by in-
direction or disguise.
Administrative determinations of the phrase may offer the most
reliable indication of its current interpretations since few decisions
imposing countervailing duties have been challenged in court by
importers and the Treasury Department's determinations have
been upheld without exception.2 4 But a comprehensive history of
past determinations is difficult to recover. Prior to 1974, the admin-
istrative practice was to publish only affirmative countervailing
duty orders, so that trade supports not constituting a "bounty or
grant" are difficult to document.25 Nevertheless, nine "general cat-
269. 19 U.S.C. § 1303 (Supp. 1978).
270. Feller, supra note 267, at 123.
271. 19 C.F.R. § 159.41 et seq. (1977).
272. G.S. Nicholas & Co. v. United States, 249 U.S. 34, 39 (1919).
273. 38 Op. Att'y Gen. 489, 491 (1936).
274. Feller supra note 267, at 125.
275. The Trade Act of 1974 requires publication of all subsequent decisions in the Fed-
[Vol. 2
Legal Implications of Unfair Practices
egories of direct and indirect bounties or grants" that have been the
subject of countervailing duty orders can be discerned:
(1) Direct Payments (premiums, bonusses, cash payments to prod-
ucers related to export sales). This type of payment was the basis
for orders against almonds from Spain in 1959,m French tomato
paste in 1968,2 s and tomato products from Greece in 1972. 271
(2) Preferential Income Tax Treatments (preferential tax rates on
export income, accelerated depreciation allowance for export pro-
duction assets, special deductions for export-related expenses, and
deferral of tax on export earnings). Preferential income tax treat-
ment was the basis for an order against Michelin tires from Canada
in 197320 (special accelerated depreciation) and consumer elec-
tronic products from Japan in 1975 (tax deferral).2 1
(3) Excessive Rebates of Indirect Taxes (rebates or drawbacks of
indirect taxes on products in excess of taxpayer's original payment
or liability). This category was the basis for upheld countervailing
duty orders against sugar imports from the Netherlands2 2 and
flour from Germany.3
(4) Rebate of Secondary Indirect Taxes (rebates of taxes paid on
purchases not directly related to manufacture or sale of the prod-
uct). Rebates on overhead items such as office equipment and
documentary stamp taxes were bases for countervailing duties on
steel products from Italy between 1967 and 1973.21
(5) Price Support Programs (maintenance of domestic prices while
selling to exporters at lower than world market prices from govern-
ment supplies). Such programs were a basis for an order against
sugar-containing products from Australia in 1958.21
(6) Export Loss Indemnification of Special Insurance Programs
(governmental risk-sharing in export trade). Imports of Danish
butter were countervailed in 1935ul on the basis of variable Danish
eral Register. 19 U.S.C. 1303(a)(6)(Supp. 1978).
276. Feller, supra note 267, at 125.
277. 94 TRas. DEC. 94 (1959).
278. 2 Cust. B. & Dec. 233 (1968).
279. 6 Cust. B. & Dec. 212 (1967).
280. 7 Cust. B. & Dec. 24 (1973).
281. 40 Fed. Reg. 5378 (1975).
282. United States v. Hill Bros. Co., 107 F.2d 107 (2d Cir. 1901).
283. 23 TREAS. DEc. 107 (1912).
284. 7 Cust. B. & Dec. 206 (1973); 6 Cust. B. & Dec. 231 (1972); 2 Cust. B. & Dec. 637
(1968); 1 Cust. B. & Dec. 212 (1967); T. D. 49896, 69 TREAs. DEC. 886 (1939).
285. 69 TREAs. DEC. 151 (1958).
286. 68 TREAs. DEC. 305 (1935).
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license fees on U.S. imports that varied with losses incurred in
exporting to the U.S.
(7) Exchange Rate Manipulations (more favorable exchange rates
on foreign currency earned on export sales than otherwise applica-
ble). Countervailing duties against imports from Germany in the
1930's 2s7 and against wool tops from Uruguay in 19532 were based
on such manipulations.
(8) Preferential Financing Terms (subsidies for finance costs, fa-
vorable credit terms for investments in machinery, preferential
export credit). A special Nova Scotia low-interest-rate loan to es-
tablish two Michelin tire manufacturing plants was the basis for a
countervailing duty action in 1973.21
(9) Other Subsidies for Specific Production or Distribution Costs
(preferential transportation rates, government sales at lower-than-
market rates, free or reduced-rate export promotional service).
Such subsidies were the bases for actions against German rolling-
mill products in 1926290 and Japanese consumer electronic products
in 1975.299
This broad range of devices that were considered "bounties or
grants" may encourage the United States semiconductor industry
to petition for countervailing duties should it try to redress the
advantage gained by bounties. Although a complaint of unfair trade
practices based on bounties is not related to unfair practices based
on misappropriation of know-how, the former may be a more effec-
tive claim for relief. The last case cited above,292 where export pro-
motional assistance provided by the Japanese External Trade Or-
ganization was considered a "bounty or grant" within the meaning
of 19 U.S.C. section 1303, supports this contention.
The administrative procedure for the imposition of countervail-
ing duties is simpler than that required for antidumping duties.
Countervailing duties are mandatory if a bounty or grant exists.1 3
Anyone may file a petition for countervailing duties "setting forth
his belief that a bounty or grant is being paid or bestowed and the
reasons therefore. .. ... 1 Any U.S. manufacturer, producer, or
wholesaler of similar merchandise may contest a determination that
287. 74 TREAs. DEC. 389 (1939); 74 TREAs. DEC. 192 (1938); 60 TREAS. DEC. 1008 (1936).
288. 88 TREAs. DEcC. 105 (1953).
289. 7 Cust. B. & Dec. 24 (1973).
290. 49 TREAs. DEC. 105 (1926).
291. 40 Fed. Reg. 5378 (1975).
292. Id.
293. 38 Op. Att'y Gen. 489, 490 (1936).
294. 19 U.S.C. § 1303 (a)(3)(A)(Supp. 1978).
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a bounty or grant does not exist and an importer may contest the
imposition of countervailing duties in the United States Customs
Court.295 Petitions are filed with the Commissioner of Customs or
any District Director of Customs. If a petition contains sufficient
information for a prima facie case, -an investigation will be initiated
and notice published in the Federal Register. The Secretary of the
Treasury must make a preliminary determination of a bounty or
grant within six months of filing a petition. 26 The preliminary deter-
mination is published in the Federal Register297 and interested par-
ties may submit written comments. A final determination must be
reached and published in the Federal Register within twelve months
after filing.28 If the final determination is affirmative, countervail-
ing duties are imposed on the subsidized goods on or after the date
of publication. 299
5. Private Actions
The international protective mechanisms reviewed above re-
quire intervention by government officials. Protective redress
through private action is very limited. Two possibilities are (1) the
provisions of the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation
(FCN) Between the United States and Japan of April 2, 1953,300
under which Japanese courts enforce U.S. arbitration awards, and
(2) the reciprocal access to foreign courts under the equivalent pro-
visions of the FCN 1 and of the convention establishing the World
Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO)312 (This convention
again modified the oft-revised Paris Union Convention of 1883.)
The FCN provides that: "Nationals and companies of either
Party shall be accorded national treatment . . . with respect to
access to courts of justice and to administrative tribunals and agen-
cies. . . in all degrees of jurisdiction, both in pursuit and in defense
of their rights.13 3 The equivalent provision in WIPO states that:
"Nationals of any country of the Union, shall as regards the protec-
tion of industrial property, enjoy in all other countries of the Union
295. 19 U.S.C. §§ 1514-16 (Supp. 1978).
296. 19 U.S.C. § 1303 (a)(4)(Supp. 1978).
297. 19 U.S.C. § 1303 (a)(6)(Supp. 1978).
298. 19 U.S.C. § 1303 (a)(4), (6) (Supp. 1978).
299. 19 U.S.C. § 1303 (b)(3)(Supp. 1978).
300. 4 U.S.T. 2063, T.I.A.S. No. 2863.
301. Id. art. IV (2).
302. Done at Stockholm July 14, 1967 and entered into force in 1970; 21 U.S.T. 1583,
T.I.A.S No. 6923.
303. Supra note 300.
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the advantages that their respective laws now grant. . . to nation-
als; . . .consequently they shall have the same protection as the
latter . . . of their rights. . .. "I"
These reciprocity provisions allow United States companies access
to the Japanese courts. That foreigners are reluctant to use Japa-
nese courts for resolution of trade secret disputes should elicit no
surprise after reading section B above. The unfair competition pro-
visions of the Paris Convention have never been applied to Japanese
trade secrets or know-how litigation. 05 As for claims based on
"industrial espionage" in particular, no Japanese law directly regu-
lates this (apparently flourishing) 3°6 activity in Japan.3 07
In addition to the provisions of the FCN treaty that require the
court§ of each country to honor arbitration awards rendered in the
other, both the United States and Japan are parties to the United
Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Arbitral Awards of 1958.308 Although our research has not disclosed
any Japanese cases that refer to the Convention, it is regarded as
one of the "winds of change which are sweeping over the whole
province of public international trade law."'30 9
The Convention does not limit arbitration to commercial dis-
putes, but requires only that the award be one "arising out of differ-
ences between persons, physical or legal. 3 10 Some of the other provi-
sions that characterize its scope and applicability indicate, that:
(1) Contracting States are obliged to recognize arbitration agree-
ments in writing concerning a subject matter capable of settlement
by arbitration".31
(2) Contracting States are obliged to recognize arbitral awards as
binding and to enforce them in accordance with the rules of proce-
dure of the territory where the award is relied upon."12
(3) To obtain enforcement, the claimant need only furnish appro-
priate copies of the award, the original agreement, and, if neces-
sary, translations.313
If the claimant satisfies (3) above, then he is entitled to recognition
304. 21 U.S.T. 1583, T.I.A.S. No. 6923.
305. WISE, supra note 139, at § 11.0516].
306. ToME, Dec. 14, 1968, at 82.
307. WISE, supra note 139, at 82-3.
308. 21 U.S.T. 2517, T.I.A.S. No. 6997; see also, K. RYYAN, supra note 251, at 340.
309. K. RYAN, supra note 251, at 342.
310. Id. at 341.
311. Id.
312. Id.
313. Id.
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and enforcement of his award unless the respondent can prove one
of the following five circumstances: 1 4
(1) The Agreement was not valid due to incapacity of the parties,
or not valid under the law of the country where the award was
made.
(2) The awarding party was for any reason unable to present his
case.
(3) The dispute did not fall within the terms of the arbitration
agreement.
(4) The arbitrators or the procedure were not in accordance with
the terms of the agreement or with the law of the country where
the arbitration occurred.
(5) The award is not yet binding or was set aside or suspended
under the law in the country where the award was made.
The enforcing country may refuse to recognize and enforce the
award on two grounds which do not require proof by the awarding
party:315
(1) The dispute is not capable of settlement by arbitration under
the law of that country.
(2) Recognition or enforcement would be contrary to the public
policy of that country.
These private action mechanisms, reciprocal access and arbi-
tration, may be more direct than those discussed earlier, but they
may also be more difficult for Silicon Valley complainants to in-
voke. The first suffers from the characteristics of the Japanese legal
system governing know-how and trade secrets that make litigation
difficult (as discussed in section B above). The second requires an
agreement to arbitrate, which may not be possible to obtain or may
require as much government intervention as the other mechanisms
available at the international level.
IV. APPLICATIONS TO SILICON VALLEY'S
COMPLAINTS
The alternative theories for the protection of know-how ex-
plored in preceding subsections A through C were discussed as a
preliminary step in the analysis of the complaints voiced by Silicon
Valley's semiconductor industry. Just as is the case with complaints
brought to an attorney by a distraught client, the first step in seek-
ing a remedy is to distinguish those elements which are legally ac-
314. Id. at 341-42.
315. Id. at 342.
No. 1]
Hastings Int'l and Comparative Law Review
tionable from those which are not. In the case of Silicon Valley, the
distinction is difficult to make.
A. Allegations, Remedies and Credibility
Complaints appearing in unofficial publications 36 allege in-
dustrial espionage,317 theft of trade secrets, disparate tariffs favoring
Japanese semiconductor imports to the United States over U.S.
exports to Japan (twelve percent versus six percent),3 1 8 dumping,
Japanese prohibition against using foreign components in its tele-
communications monopolys1 and Japanese government subsidy of
its semi-conductor industry.2 If any of these allegations can be
proved, then an appropriate legal remedy can be found.321 Criminal
law and tort law can be used in cases of industrial espionage or
theft; 322 presidential action under the Trade Act of 1974 could be
invoked for disparate tariffs and import prohibitions; 323 the Anti-
dumping Law can provide a remedy for dumping tactics; 3 1 the
Countervailing Duty Law is directly applicable to the problem
raised by Japanese subsidies.32 5 But closer inspection of the indus-
try's complaints coupled with reasonable skepticism casts doubt on
their total credibility.
The strident tone which characterizes the complaints reveals
the anger and frustration of the Silicon Valley semiconductor indus-
try. The emotional nature of the complaints suggests that they
should be carefully scrutinized to separate the elements of in-
dustrial lobbying from the substantive elements which might con-
stitute grounds for legal action. Although some substantive ele-
ments may be supported by fact, a close reading of the complaints
provides several reasons for suspecting that the industry is pleading
primarily for governmental protective measures.
First, Silicon Valley's assertions to the contrary, the Japanese
product may in fact be superior."' If so, its effectiveness in market
316. FORTUNE, supra note 1.
317. Id.
318. Id. at 78.
319. Id.
320. Id. at 75.
321. Id. Allegations of other activities such as "aggressive" requirement or purchase of
small semiconductor companies to disguise "advanced engineering listening posts," may not
justify charges of unfair competition, but indicate further questionable business practices.
322. See Section M. A.4-6., supra.
323. See Section III. C.1., supra.
324. See Section III. C.3., supra.
325. See Section 11. C.4., supra.
326. FORTUNE, supra note 1, at 78 (indicates superior testing and reliable production);
at 79 (Japanese manufacturers may "be first with a production-quality 64K memory chip
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competition would not be the result of unfair practices by the Japa-
nese. In that case, the complaints simply reflect the distress of an
industry unable to keep pace with foreign competition unless its
government takes action in its behalf.
Second, it is not necessary to attribute the market advantages
enjoyed by Japanese semiconductor products to unfair trade prac-
tices. Even if the Japanese product were not superior, it is easily
imaginable that its price advantage in the U.S. market may be due
to other well-known factors affecting price such as the favorable cost
of labor, balance of trade and currency exchange values. 321
Finally, in spite of all the references to industrial espionage"'
and misappropriation of semiconductor know-how, up to the time
of this writing, no legal action has been initiated against a Japanese
offender for such practices in the semiconductor industry, where
they are reportedly rampant.2 9 There are, however, a few such cases
in other technical industries.330 The fact that the United States sem-
iconductor industry has undertaken so little litigation against the
Japanese in spite of the many complaints about industrial espio-
nage and know-how misappropriation, invites consideration of three
possible explanations. (1) Silicon Valley has not been severely dam-
aged by trade secret violations. (2) Violations of trade secrets by
Japanese competitors do give them an unfair advantage, but diffi-
culties in proving misconduct make litigation impracticable. (3)
The purpose of publicizing trade secret violations is directed toward
a goal different from preventive or remedial action against such
violations-perhaps redress of other injuries. From the facts avail-
able, the third explanation is the most plausible. The second, how-
ever, should also be copsidered. Therefore, putting aside the diffi-
culties in proving misconduct, some features of remedial and pre-
ventive measures available for violations of trade secrets should be
recalled before considering the most promising course of action ap-
propriate for other grievances. The efficacy of a given protective
mechanism will naturally depend on the facts in the case at hand.
On the Japanese industrial front, the law of trade secret protec-
tion is still in its infancy. Similarly, Japanese tort and criminal law
. . ." and "unencumbered by older technology," the Japanese are quicker to adopt the
newest production processes).
327. Secretary of Commerce Kreps reported on Oct. 3, 1978, that the U.S. trade deficit
with Japan will reach $13 billion for this year alone at the present rate." In 1977, the deficit
was $8 billion. The U.S. has had a deficit in trade with Japan for the last 13 years. San
Francisco Chronicle, Oct. 4, 1978, at 29, col. 4.
328. Id. FORTUNE, note 1 supra.
329. Id.
330. United States v. Farrar, No. 78-114 (D. S.C., filed Aug. 8, 1978).
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have not developed sufficient legal foundations on which a foreign
plaintiff may rely for prosecution of trade secret misappropriation.
Moreover, the expense, language barrier and cultural differences
discourage a foreigner from litigating in Japan.
On the domestic front, the industry can combine several mea-
sures to effect better prevention than any single mechanism can
provide. For example, carefully drafted employment contracts with
those privy to trade secrets may be combined with continuous
record-keeping on employees who have access to trade secrets and
with restriction of such access to the smallest possible number of
people. The employment contracts can indicate clearly what infor-
mation is to be kept secret and other obligations between employer
and employee that are to be respected. The agreements can also
include appropriate partial restraints (such as non-competition
after termination of employment), provisions for severability and
for periodic review and revision of additional trade secrets to be kept
in confidence.
A business that uncovers evidence of practices subject to possi-
ble criminal, tort, antitrust or antidumping actions may undertake
litigation despite the cost in time and money because of its deterrent
effect on other potential offenders. By its reputation for vigilance,
an industry that vigorously pursues those engaged in illegal prac-
tices may afford itself a degreee of protection to trade secrets.
On the international level, protection against trade secret viola-
tions is primarily remedial, dependent on government policy and
more appropriate to the larger category of unfair competition. For
example, the Trade Act of 1974 appears to offer a reasonable oppor-
tunity for the semiconductor industry to protect itself against unfair
import competition. In order to invoke the protection of the Act,
however, the industry must first secure the attention and coopera-
tion of the Advisory Committee for Trade Negotiations.33 This
Committee, which serves as liason between the private sector and
the President, may then persuade him to exercise his authority to
impose surcharges on imports or to negotiate tariff modifications on
behalf of disadvantaged United States trade interests. Another type
of remedy, the exertion of political pressure in an international
forum may be available through GATT.
B. A Japanese Reply and Its Implications
A Japanese perception of the Silicon Valley complaints should
aid an evaluation of their legal merits and appropriate action for
331. See text accompanying note 246 supra.
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them. One of the Silicon Valley newsletters' 2 summarizes a reply
by H. William Tanaka, spokesperson for the Electronic Industries
Association of Japan, to several of the charges against his govern-
ment's policies and his industry's practices. Some of his responses
are:
(1) [The level of U.S. semiconductor imports from . . . Japan]
may be due to the inadequacy or absence of domestic supply,
technological obsolescence of competing domestic products, mar-
ket forfeitures and delayed market entries resulting from conserva-
tive corporate investment and product planning decisions...
(2) The technological and marketing lead that U.S .. . firms have
maintained in ultra-miniature semiconductor circuitry. . . is be-
yond any serious challenge from foreign competitors . . . U.S.
firms are expected to account for nearly two-thirds of all transisd
tors, integrated circuits, and other solid state electronic compo-
nents that will be sold in world markets this year...
(3) U.S. semiconductor manufacturers have consistently captured
a large share of the Japanese market. . . [30 percent of the Japa-
nese market is accounted for by imports of which the U.S. accounts
for 18 percent directly and 9.6 percent through third country sub-
sidiaries]. Thus U.S.-based multinational corporations account
for about 90 percent of all ICs [integrated circuits] imported by
Japan...
(4) Japanese exports to the U.S. in 1976 totaled $18 million or less
than 2 percent of the U.S. IC market. . . Japanese imports of ICs
manufactured by U.S. companies are seven and one-half times
more than Japanese exports to the U.S.
(5) [The claims made by U.S. industry spokesmen that the Japa-
nese Government subsidizes exports of ICs by making special long-
term low-interest loans available from the Ex-Im Bank of Japan
are untrue.]
(6) The Japanese Government does fund, in part, research and
development of basic VLSI technology used for computers,. . . In
light of the fact that U.S. computer technology as well as semicon-
ductor technology was developed largely under U.S. Federal Gov-
ernment R&D and procurement funding, and the further fact that
Canadian, French, and West German Governments also subsidize
semiconductor R&D, the claim of unfairness suggests that a double
standard of fairness is contemplated, one which applies to Japan
and another which applies to all other countries.
332. Id.; see also D. Hoefler, MICROLcTRaONIc NEWS with Manager's Casebook (with
Manager's Casebook, April 8, 1978).
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(7) [The disparate tariffs imposed by Japan and the U.S. are]
• ..irrelevant to multinational U.S. products. . . in spite of the
tariff, U.S. semiconductor exports to Japan have exceeded and
continue to exceed Japanese imports to the U.S.. . . The conten-
tion that the higher tariff paid by the U.S. manufacturers is an
effective barrier to sales is refuted by U.S. industry experience in
Europe . . .Despite the Common Market . . .rates of about 17
percent, U.S. manufacturers have still captured an estimated 80
percent of the . . . market.
Tanaka's reply argues that the problems besetting our semiconduc-
tor industry are the result of its own corporate policies which have
allowed its Japanese competitors to make minor inroads into the
United States market.
Although this interpretation should be taken with a grain of
salt,3 a reasonable person evaluating the relative merits of the
Silicon Valley complaints and Tanaka's reply would at least ques-
tion the severity of a Japanese threat to the U.S. semiconductor
industry. One may even conclude that the complaints are little more
than political lobbying for government aid in acquiring a still larger
share of an already preponderant portion of a profitable pie.
Tanaka makes no mention of misappropriation of know-how
and acknowledges his government's support of semiconductor tech-
nology.31 If his failure to mention misappropriation is a recognition
of such behavior, then the suitable remedies are those summarized
above. 3 1 If the government support acknowledged by Tanaka3 3 1 can
be deemed a "bounty or grant, ' 33 then the appropriate remedy
would be a countervailing duty designed to balance the disadvan-
tage which such a subsidy imposes on United States industry.33 The
imposition of countervailing duties would be directly responsive to
the complaints of the semiconductor industry. Moreover, the com-
plaints about unfair competition appear more credible if based on
government subsidy than if based on claims of unactionable or un-
provable industrial espionage.340 Accordingly, the prospects for per-
333. E.g., Item (2) ignores the alleged trend which points to Japanese domination if not
checked; item (3) refers to 90% of Japanese semiconductor imports attributable to U.S., but
does not indicate what it would be if imports were not regulated; items (3) and (7) refer to
multinational U.S. corporations ignoring smaller U.S. corporations which may be damaged
more seriously by the policies alleged.
334. ForUNE, note 1 supra.
335. See item (6) in text accompanying note 332 supra.
336. See section III. A.4., supra.
337. See item (6) in text accompanying note 332 supra.
338. See notes 272 and 273 supra.
339. See notes 266 and 267 supra.
340. See text accompanying notes 330 and 329 supra.
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suading the United States government to assess countervailing du-
ties deserve further discussion.
V. PROSPECTS FOR COUNTERVAILING DUTIES
AND ZENITH v. UNITED STATES
A.. Inferences Based on Earlier Petitions for Countervailing Duties.
Some indication of the prospects for a successful petition for
countervailing duties may be inferred from the "nine general cate-
gories" summarized in section IH. C.4. above. 34' The most promising
among them are "Direct Payments" and "Other Subsidies for Spe-
cific Production or Distribution Costs" (categories (1) and (9) in III
C.4.). From these categories, it can be argued that the admitted
Japanese government support for the R & D costs of its semiconduc-
tor industry constitutes a "direct payment related to export sales"
or a "subsidy for a specific production cost" (namely, research and
development).
B. Zenith Radio Corporation v. United States
On June 21, 1978, in the case of Zenith v. United States the
U.S. Supreme Court affirmed34 2 the decision of the Court of Customs
and Patent Appeals upholding the Secretary of the Treasury's rejec-
tion of a petition for assessment of "countervailing duties on various
consumer electronic products exported from Japan to this coun-
try. '343 The Court summarized its views on the purpose and appli-
cability of countervailing duties, which left open the possibility
that financial support by a foreign government for R & D costs of
products exported to this country constitutes a "bounty or grant."
The issue in Zenith34 was:
... whether Japan confers a "bounty" or "grant" on certain
consumer electronic products by failing to impose a commodity tax
on those products when they are exported, while imposing the tax
on the products when they are sold in Japan.
Zenith alleged that Japan had bestowed a "bounty or grant"
by "remitting the Japanese Commodity Tax that would have been
imposed had the products been sold within Japan. 1345 The Court
341. See Feller, supra note 267, at 123.
342. Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States, - U.S. _, 98 S. Ct. 2441 (1978).
343. Id. at 2443.
344. Id.
345. Id.
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affirmed the Treasury Department's position "that the nonexces-
sive remission of an indirect tax is not a bounty or grant within the
meaning of the statute." '46 (There was no dispute over "the nonex-
cessive nature of the remission or the indirect nature of the tax") .7
The Court reviewed the history of construing indirect tax rebates as
"bounty or grant" and affirmed the longstanding construction that
such rebates constitute a bounty "only to the extent that the remis-
sion exceeded the taxes otherwise due. 134 (The decision is in accord
with those in "general category (3).")
The opinion contains several statements that are relevant to
the prospects for construing government support of R & D as a
"bounty or grant":
(1) [The purpose of the statute] is relatively clear ...and is
confirmed by the congressional debates: the countervailing duty
was intended to offset the unfair competitive advantage that for-
eign producers would otherwise enjoy from export subsidies paid
by their governments.34
(2) The theory underlying the (Treasury) Department's position
was that a foreign country's remission of indirect taxes did not
constitute subsidization of that country's exports. Rather, such
remission was viewed as a reasonable measure for avoiding double
taxation of exports - once by the foreign country and once upon
sale in this country.ml
(3) [Quoting from Udall v. Tallman, 180 U.S. 1, 16 (1965), quoting
Unemployment Compensation Commission v. Aragon, 329 U.S.
143, 153 (1946)] when faced with a problem of statutory construc-
tion, this Court shows great deference to the interpretation given
the statute by the officers or agency charged with its administra-
tion. 'To sustain [an agency's] application of [a] statutory term,
we need not find that its construction is the only reasonable one,
or even that it is the result we would have reached had the question
arisen in the first instance in judicial proceedings.'3 '
These quotes support the argument that the Japanese receive an
unfair competitive advantage through bounties in the form of finan-
cial support of research and development contributing to increased
exports of semiconductor chips to the United States. The advantage
appears to be of the type which "the countervailing duty was in-
346. Id. at 2444.
347. Id. at 2444 n.9.
348. Id. at 2451.
349. Id. at 2448.
350. Id.
351. Id. at 2445.
[Vol. 2
Legal Implications of Unfair Practices
tended to offset." In such cases, "The Secretary of the Treasury
must levy a countervailing duty 'equal to the net amount of such
bounty or grant' upon importation of the product into the United
States, ' 352 and his interpretation is given "great deference"((3)
above). Therefore, domestic manufacturers can petition the Treas-
ury Department to impose a countervailing duty. In arguing for the
duty, the industry can contend that although nonexcessive remis-
sion of indirect taxes on exported consumer products can be ration-
alized as a "reasonable measure for avoiding double taxation,"3 3 no
such rationalization seems applicable in support of R & D costs for
semiconductor components.
C. Governmental Redress in General
Consideration of prospects for imposition of countervailing du-
ties raises the question of governmental policy toward redress for
United States industries injured by foreign competitors who have
the "unfair" advantage of their government's encouragement of
exports. This question in turn raises more general ones concerning
the appropriate level of governmental involvement by the United
States on behalf of its industry. This note is not the place to analyze
these important questions.
The policies of the United States government on international
business are the subjects of endless controversy. Even in the narrow
context of the semiconductor industry's allegations, a multitude of
credible assertions can be made that would result in a multitude of
conclusions on what government policy should be.
An attempt to formulate policies that would eliminate Silicon
Valley's difficulties without causing substantial injury elsewhere
may be a temptation to the foolhardy, but is too speculative for
analysis in legal terms. A concise but penetrating summary of the
political, economic and diplomatic ramifications of countervailing
duties appears in a note analyzing the Zenith case in the Court of
Customs and Patent Appeals .31 The following excerpt should indi-
cate the care with which assertions about governmental policy, even
when restricted to the single consideration of countervailing duties,
must be handled.
The Zenith decision raises some basic questions for the struc-
ture of international trade. First, although countervailing duties
are imposed to offset export subsidies by a foreign government, this
352. Id. at 2442.
353. Id. at 2448.
354. Note, International Trade: Countervailing Duties, 19 HARv. INT'L L. J. 403 (1978).
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does not necessarily mean that trade distribution and resource
allocation will be returned to optimal efficiency. Second, as the
Zenith court stated, the use of countervailing duties is one of the
bargaining chips "in a game played by governments on a world
stage." Countries, in setting their foreign policy, need to assess
whether the imposition of countervailing duties in order to garner
strength for trade negotiations is sufficiently efficacious so as to
warrant the costs necessarily imposed on other sectors of the econ-
omy. Third, the effectiveness of countervailing duties may be off-
set by subsidies that are more subtle than cash payments and tax
rebates to the export industry. Finally, export subsidies and coun-
tervailing duties raise the issue of the extent to which the domestic
commercial policy of any nation should be held accountable for its
effects in foreign countries. The Court of Customs and Patent Ap-
peals is neither expected nor authorized to resolve these major
policy issues. It is the Congress, along with the Secretary of the
Treasury and the United States tariff negotiators, who must evalu-
ate the need and efficacy of the countervailing duty as an economic
tool, and who must state clearly for importers, import competitors,
and the courts in what circumstances a tax rebate constitute a
bounty or a grant.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
Many different protective mechanisms, both preventive and
remedial, are available to the owner of a trade secret. Each protec-
tion has only limited applicability to the multitude of complaints
sounded in Silicon Valley. For any specific wrong, however, one or
more preventive measures may be highly effective and one or more
remedies may redress the resulting injury if the allegations can be
proved.
Preventive measures are available primarily under contract
law. Remedies are available by private actions under state and fed-
eral laws governing intellectual property. To a lesser extent similar
remedies are available in Japan.
Additional remedies may be available through government ac-
tions on the international level, particularly against unfair trade
practices alleging the involvement of the Japanese government.
The accessible facts form at best a hazy picture of the actual
grievances troubling the domestic semiconductor industry. The ha-
ziness may be the result of unduly restricted information or of the
difficulties in proving allegations of misconduct and obtaining relief
through litigation. We note the dearth of cases charging wrongful
acquisition of semiconductor know-how in spite of the specificity,
variety and stridency of the publicized complaints.
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If Japanese government subsidy of VLSP55 research and devel-
opment can be considered a "bounty or grant" within the meaning
of the Countervailing Duty Law, then a powerful protection for the
industry could be sought through the Commissioner of Customs by
petition for the imposition of a countervailing duty. In its discussion
of countervailing duties on consumer electronic products, the recent
Supreme Court opinion in Zenith left open the question of whether
government support of industrial research is a "bounty." Strong
arguments that the admitted support 56 of industrial semiconductor
research by the Japanese government constitutes a "bounty or
grant" within the meaning of the Countervailing Duty Law, has a
good chance of justifying the imposition of a countervailing duty.
355. See note 23 and text accompanying note 332 supra.
356. See text accompanying note 332 supra.
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Appendix A
The following chronology of a typical dumping case 3 7 shows the
difficulties which face a lawyer representing a semiconductor produ-
cer who claims injury due to sales of Japanese products imported
to this country and sold at LTFV. Administrative responsibilities in
a dumping investigation are split between the Treasury Department
and the U.S. International Trade Commission (ITC). When a com-
plaint is received from a U.S. producer, the Customs Service of the
Treasury Department carries out the required investigations and
the Secretary determines whether LTFV sales have occurred and,
if so, the amount of the dumping margin. If such a margin is found,
the case is turned over to the ITC to determine whether the LTFV
sales are injuring or threatening injury to a particular industry. If
injury is found by the Commission, dumping duties are assessed.
(1) Complaint by U.S. producer: 38 The producer notifies the
Commissioner that a foreign producer is selling in the U.S. at
LTFV. The information provided with the complaint must include
a description or sample of the foreign merchandise, the name and
country of the exporter, ports of entry into the U.S., evidence that
a U.S. industry is being. injured, and data on home market sales
prices indicating LTFV sales.
(2) Customs Service Procedure: 39 The Secretary of the Treas-
ury has 30 days to decide whether to initiate a formal investigation
or to close the case. If there is "substantial doubt" about injury to
a U.S. industry, the complaint may be referred to the ITC, which
then has 30 days in which to determine whether there is sufficient
indication of injuries. If possible dumping and possible injury are
found, the Customs Service will start a formal investigation after
notice is published in the Federal Register. The Secretary of the
Treasury then has generally six months to make a preliminary de-
termination of LTFV sales. If LTFV sales are found, notice is pub-
lished in the Federal Register and the Secretary orders the
"withholding of appraisement" for the merchandise entered after
that date or entered (but not liquidated) up to 120 days prior to
publication of the notice of initiation of the investigation.
(3) Withholding of Appraisement:6 0 The Customs Service will
release goods arriving at U.S. ports to the importer under bond
without making a determination of the duty payable on the goods
357. This chronology follows the lucid description in Clubb, supra note 240, at 358.
358. 19 C.F.R. §§ 153.26-28 (1977).
359. 19 U.S.C. § 160(b)-(c) (1978); 19 C.F.R. § 153.31(a) (1977).
360. Clubb, supra note 259, at 98.
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until the Treasury Department has decided on the existence of
dumping. If the decision is affirmative, antidumping duties will be
determined and imposed on the goods. The bond required for release
of goods during withholding of appraisement must be sufficient to
cover the value of the goods, any ordinary duties payable, and addi-
tional antidumping duties which may be payable. This bond which
must be posted for each shipment arriving after receipt of Notice of
Withholding of Appraisement can be quite large. The cumulative
amount of the bond can add appreciably to the final price of the
goods and may be more than some weakly capitalized importers can
manage. The withholding period is usually three months, but the
importer or foreign producer may request an additional three
months during which additional information may be presented to
Treasury in order to reverse the preliminary dumping finding. If the
Secretary makes an affirmative finding of dumping, the case is then
referred to the ITC for injury determination.
(4) ITC Proceedings:36 ' The ITC has three months in which to
determine whether "an industry in the U.S." has been or is likely
to be injured or is prevented from being established as a result of
LTFV sales. The ITC will normally hold a formal hearing about half
way through the course of its investigation during which interested
parties, usually groups of domestic producers and importers may
present evidence and limited cross-examination is permitted. The
central questions to be decided are the standards of injury and the
determination of which "U.S. industry" has suffered harm." ' Cur-
rently, the de minimis standard suffices: if any member of the in-
dustry "has lost more than an immaterial amount of sales to the
LTFV imports, it is enough to justify an injury finding." At the
conclusion of its investigation, the Commission issues a finding of
injury or no injury and reports it to the Secretary of the Treasury.
The findings are accompanied by opinions of the Commissioner and
are published in the Federal Register.
(5) Duty Assessment by Customs Service: 3 3 When the Secre-
tary receives notice that the ITC has found injury, the case is sent
back to Customs Service for determination of the dumping duties
and the past entries subject to these duties. The duty is the differ-
361. 19 U.S.C. § 160 (1978), 19 C.F.R. §§ 201.11 208.4, 208.6 (1977).
362. Clubb, supra note 259, at 101. The definition of "U.S. Industry" seems flexible and
is the subject of considerable controversy. In various cases harm may be found for a single
company or for 100 companies; it may refer to a region or may include the entire country.
See J.J. Barcel6; Antidumping Laws as Barriers to Trade - The United States and the
International Antidumping Code, 57 CoaRNi L. Rav. 491 (1972).
363. Id.
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ence between the fair value of the item and the LTFV price for
which it was sold. After two years, Customs will consider a request
to revoke the dumping finding if the foreign manufacturer's price
has been high enough so that no dumping duties were payable.
(6) Judicial Review:3' 4 Importers may challenge the determina-
tions of the Secretary and U.S. claimants may challenge negative
determinations in Customs Court. A challenger must submit writ-
ten notice to the Secretary within 30 days after publication of the
determination and the Secretary must then publish notice of the
challenge in the Federal Register. Within 30 days of notice of inten-
tion to contest, an action may be initiated in the U.S. Customs
Court.
364. 19 U.S.C. § 1514 (Supp. 1978).
